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NOTE ON PRONOUN USAGE 
At the time of this writing, the use of masculine pronouns when referring to 
unspecified individuals has been discredited, but no alternative has been widely agreed 
upon. For the purposes of this thesis, plurals, passive voice or combined pronouns 
could be confusing. Therefore, the thesis employs an emerging convention found in 
some of the literature surveyed. Unspecified individuals will sometimes be male, 
sometimes female. There will be continuity within each example. In a given example 
or line of thought the unspecified individual will be referred to as he, while in another 
the individual will be referred to as she. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROL 
"Life is a relentless pursuit for control" (Wong, 1992, p. 143). From our first 
days as infants, our development is linked to learning that our actions have 
consequences. We cry and an adult comes to care for us; we shake our bodies and a 
toy makes noise. Childhood, and particularly adolescence, becomes a push for more 
and more personal freedom from authority figures. In our adult lives we strive for 
power in our careers, personal relationships and social interactions. As we grow older 
maintaining control becomes more and more difficult, and yet, may contribute to 
prolonging our lives. "Across the life span, every significant developmental transition 
provides new challenges for perceived and actual control" (Rodin, 1990, p. 11 ). 
Unless we have some perception of control over our own lives, whether that 
perception is accurate or not, we are reduced to the basic level of survival. DeCharms 
(1968) wrote that "man's primary motivational propensity is to be effective in 
producing changes in his environment. Man strives to be a causal agent. His nature 
commits him to this path and his very life depends on it" (p. 269). 
Many of us spend much of our time in power struggles, living with a level of 
stress which eventually begins to erode our health. If we become sick or fall victim to 
crime or accident, we search for meaning as a way to repair the perception of loss of 
control. On another level, cultural and gender differences in attitudes toward control 
make understanding each other difficult. Nations plunge their citizens into wars over 
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power and control, and Wong (1992) states, "The theme of control in all its variations 
permeates every aspect of the real life drama" (p. 147). 
In his book, The Denial of Death, Becker (1973) described the existential terror 
people feel living in a frighteningly uncertain world. He argued that we attempt to 
cope with that terror on a day-to-day basis by creating positive, life-affirming 
illusions. In other words, in instances where we find we cannot directly control our 
environment, we may still feel compelled to attempt some measure of control through 
our cognitions. 
Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982) suggest that persons value control so 
highly, they very rarely abandon the quest for it. The authors point out that most early 
theories of perceived control, especially learned helplessness and locus of control 
theories, look only at what they call primary control, attempts to change the world so 
that it satisfies the self's needs. When attempts at primary control fail, the authors 
suggest that, rather than giving up, we may switch to a process they call secondary 
control. The inward behaviors of passivity, withdrawal and submissiveness, which 
other theorists believe reflect relinquished control, more often seem to these authors to 
be attempts to sustain a perception of control by adjusting our inner worlds in order to 
fit more comfortably into the outside world we have been unable to change. 
Personal control is almost unique in being a concept which refers to the 
relationship between a person and his or her world (Syme, 1990). The concept of 
control is being studied by not only clinical, educational, social and industrial 
psychologists, but medical practitioners, philosophers, sociologists, theologians. etc. 
One result of this is that there has been a proliferation of concepts about control which 
include: 
locus of control beliefs, locus of causality, desired control, participatory control, 
shared control, primary and secondary control, contingency judgments, self-
efficacy, mastery, competence, power motive, autonomy, freedom, 
responsibility, psychological reactance, learned helplessness, mindfulness and 
mindlessness, and the illusion of control. (Wong, 1992, p. 144) 
At this point there does not appear to be one theory of control which can handle 
every aspect of this important concept. Despite this fact, however, there are 
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compelling reasons to investigate perceived control. Recent research has shown that 
having control is not always, as previously thought, beneficial, and the perception that 
we have control may be more important than the actuality of having it. Rodin (1990) 
wrote that "judgments of personal control not only influence how people operate in 
various activities but also determine which activities and environments they choose to 
expose themselves to" (p. 10). In addition, it appears that individuals' preferences for 
control vary widely. "People who most fear losing control are those who make a 
special point of being in control all the time" (Viscott, 1976, p. 69). Control can be 
linked to both physical and emotional pathology. A strong desire for control coupled 
with low levels of competence and morality is also the surest way to produce leaders 
who invariably ruin everything under their control. Indeed, a wide variety of 
problems, such as mental disorders, marital breakdown, job stress, and low 
productivity can be attributed to power struggles and the politics of control. 
At this point, it should be clear that control is not only a crucial subject of study, 
but also an extremely elusive one. In their book, Child Psychopathology and the Quest 
for Control, (1989) Rothbaum and Weisz suggest the following: 
Perhaps it is the pervasiveness of control that makes it so difficult to detect. 
Unlike "drives" that manifest themselves in brief bursts of energy, control 
motivation is a chronic condition. When not intensely directed toward specific 
instrumental ends, it is seen in such everyday behaviors as play, exploration and 
exercise. It is so much a part of our lives that we have difficulty stepping back 
and taking stock of it. The aphorism 'The fish are the last to discover the ocean' 
often applies to people's discovery of their desire for control. (p. 19) 
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Given our strong motivation for control, and how pervasive that motivation is, it 
seems important for us to understand as much about how we attempt to control our 
own lives as possible. Despite the fact that there have been a proliferation of theories 
from a number of disciplines attempting to explain various aspects of control, with no 
one emerging as an organizing theory, there are things we know now which can be 
used to design interventions for persons, children, employees, patients, the elderly, and 
even nations. Each of the various theories adds to our knowledge of control and 
coping, but none of them fully addresses the distinctions proposed in Rothbaum et 
al.' s (1982) theory of primary and secondary control. These authors' two process 
theory has been chosen as the subject of this investigation because it is one of the first 
control theories to focus not only on what the experimenter can see the subject do or 
not do, but also on the inner workings of the subject. The realization that individuals 
attempt control not only through behaviors but also through cognitive processes opens 
up a complex and fruitful area of study with enormous potential for application in the 
real world. Perhaps by combining the research done in various fields on this concept, 
conclusions can be drawn about when and how to use primary and secondary control 
strategies most adaptively. 
The purpose of the present paper is to bring together what we have learned about 
primary and secondary control since 1982 when Rothbaum et al. first introduced these 
concepts. The thesis will address the following six questions: (1) What is the two 
process model and (2) how does it relate to other control theories such as locus of 
control and learned helplessness? These questions will be addressed in Chapter Two. 
(3) How do primary and secondary control processes change over the developmental 
stages of the life cycle? Chapter Three will discuss changes from infancy to old age. 
Questions (4) How does the two process model relate to physical health? and (5) Does 
use of primary and secondary control strategies change in different religions and 
cultures? will be addressed in Chapter Four and (6) What are the implications for 
future application and research? will be explored in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE TWO PROCESS MODEL AND OTHER CONTROL THEORIES 
Control is a little like love; most of us know it when we see or feel it, but we 
would be hard pressed to define it exactly. Researchers continue to wrestle with the 
task of finding a way of pinning down this intangible construct. Most psychology of 
control theories have been about behavior-can we make something happen? Miller 
(1979) stated that control is the ability (actual or perceived, and present or potential) to 
start, modify, or terminate stimuli. According to this definition, it would seem that 
control is something that can be given by another (e.g., the experimenter) and, 
therefore, something that can be taken away or limited (Piper & Langer, 1986). 
Most other control theorists had similar definitions. Antonovsky (1979) 
proposed a distinction between "being in control over things" (the self is in control) 
and "things being under control" (i.e., others can be in control without harming one's 
feelings of control). Thompson (1981) wrote that control is the belief that one has at 
one's disposal a response that can influence the aversiveness of an event. White & 
Janson (1986) theorized that control is an ability to cause or influence intended 
outcomes by differential responding and results in a sense of effectiveness desired by 
the individual person. Wallston, Wallston, Smith & Dobbins (1987) suggest that 
perceived control is the belief that one can determine one's own internal states and 
behavior, influence one's environment, and/or bring about desired outcomes. This 
chapter will explain the two process model, state how its authors define control, and 
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compare and contrast it with other leading theories of control psychology. 
The Two Process Model 
For the purposes of this thesis, control is defined as causing an intended event. 
The essential difference between this definition, developed by Rothbaum et al. (1982), 
and those of other control theorists is that an intended event may include influencing 
external realities or influencing internal psychological states to affect the impact of 
external realities on the self. According to the two process model, there are two broad 
paths by which individuals attempt to pursue control. Rothbaum et al. suggest that, 
generally, individuals attempt to alter objective realities in the world in order to bring 
them into line with their wishes. This path is called primary control as it fits the more 
traditional definition of control. If the individual is unsuccessful at primary control, he 
may become withdrawn and passive. Learned helplessness and locus of control 
theorists would, at this point, perceive that the individual had relinquished control. 
Rothbaum and his colleagues, however, believe that individuals only rarely relinquish 
control. Instead, the authors suggest that the individual will usually attempt to 
accommodate to objective conditions by altering himself in order to effect a satisfying 
alignment with existing realities. The two processes are outlined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROL: AN OVERVIEW 
(Adapted from Weisz, Rothbaum & Blackburn, 1984) 
Primary Control Secondary Control 
Overall Goal enhance reward or reduce enhance reward or reduce 
punishment punishment 
Means to Goal modify objective modify self to fit objective 
conditions to fit self conditions 
General Strategy influence objective accommodate to objective 
conditions conditions in order to 
influence their impact on 
self 
Typical Targets people, things, events, one's own expectations, 
symptoms, problems ideas, wishes, perceptions, 
goals 
Rothbaum et al. originally proposed four types of secondary control based on 
various patterns of causal attributions that people show in their reasoning about 
control: predictive, illusory, vicarious and interpretive. Each secondary control type 
also has a complementary form of primary control. Instead of a concentration on using 
cognitions to change the self, the primary control strategy, like traditional views of 
control, focuses on changing the environment. The difference between primary and 
secondary control strategies is on where the subject places the emphasis. Descriptions 
of primary and secondary control processes are included in Table 2. 
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TABLE2 
TYPES OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROL 
(Adapted from Blackburn, 1984) 
Primary Secondary 
Predictive Control predict events and predict events and 
attempts to ... conditions to select conditions to control their 
strategies most likely to impact on self, especially 
make objective conditions future disappointment 
fit one's own needs, wishes, 
goals 
Illusory Control influence or capitalize on get in synchrony with 
attempts to ... chance to increase the chance to enhance comfort 
likelihood that fate will fit with and acceptance of fate 
one's needs, wishes, goals 
Vicarious Control emulate the behavior, associate or closely align 
attempts to ... values of powerful persons with other persons, groups 
groups or institutions to or institutions to share 
influence objective psychologically in the 
conditions as they do control they exert 
Interpretive Control understand or construe understand or construe 
attempts to ... objective conditions to objective conditions so as to 
master them (e.g. find meaning or purpose 
understand a problem to 
solve it) 
Selective Attention focus attention on specific focus attention away from a 
attempts to ... elements of a problem to problem to avoid the 
solve it unpleasant thoughts and 
feelings associated with it 
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Predictive primary control refers to attempts to predict events so as to succeed at 
them. An example of predictive primary control would be attempting to predict what 
questions an interviewer might ask in a job interview so as to be able to prepare 
satisfactory answers before the meeting thereby enhancing one's attractiveness as a 
job candidate. Predictive secondary control is primarily used to avert disappointment. 
If an individual can predict an aversive event, she can adjust her expectations and, 
therefore, experience less discrepancy and loss between the expected and the actual. 
On the other hand, if the individual fails after expecting success, she suffers a double 
defeat; not only has she failed to perform the task, but she has failed as a predictor as 
well. Predicting that one will not be the candidate hired for the job position so as not 
to be disappointed is an example of predictive secondary control. 
Attempts to align the self with chance, luck or fate are instances of illusory 
control. An example of illusory primary control would be realizing that it is 
chance/fate which determines who wins a raffle and trying to influence your chances 
by buying several tickets. An example of illusory secondary control is kissing the 
tickets before you deposit them in the raffle box in hopes that you can seduce good 
luck. Paradoxically, despite the fact that a person may admit that he knows that luck 
and chance are entirely non contingent, he may still persist in the belief that he is 
lucky by nature or that he can court luck with effort, superstitious behavior or rituals 
(Weisz, 1986b ). 
Similarly, attempts to align the self with powerful others, or vicarious control, 
involve the illusion that one can gain control by identifying with others who possess 
characteristics such as dominance, expertise, competence and power (Rothbaum et 
al.). By associating with and submitting to authority figures, the Lord, or the Chicago 
Cubs, the individual hopes to attain vicarious control. An example of vicarious 
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primary control would be imitating a successful athlete in hopes of being able to hit, 
run or throw as well as he. Deriving a sense of control from attending the games of, or 
wearing the colors or logo of, winning teams demonstrate vicarious secondary control. 
Beliefs in supernatural powers, astrologers and mystics combine attempts to align the 
self with both chance (illusory control) and powerful others (vicarious control). 
All of the preceding secondary control processes; predictive, illusory and 
vicarious; are involved in interpretive control. If an individual can understand the 
meaning of an event, he can more easily accept it, and by accepting it, he perceives 
himself to be in control of it and somewhat protected from it in the future. An example 
of interpretive primary control is trying to understand why you were burglarized so 
that you can minimize the consequences of and possible future instances of 
victimization. Here, a person may try to determine if she was at fault in any way by 
leaving a window unlocked or newspapers in the front yard. An example of 
interpretive secondary control would be accepting the fact that you have been 
traumatized and finding a "purpose" in it, such as reconsidering your attachment to 
material things. 
Blackbum (1984) introduced a fifth type of secondary control, selective 
attention, in which the person controls unpleasant thoughts and feelings by focusing 
his attention away from a problem. In primary selective attention, substance abusers 
who are members of twelve-step groups focus their attempts to stay sober "one day at 
a time", "one hour at a time" or even "one minute at a time" if necessary. While the 
abuser is still using, however, she may focus her thoughts on anything but the 
problems her substance use is creating in her life in order to avoid realizing she has a 
problem. Besides selective attention, there are still more secondary control processes 
which have not been exposed as such at present (Weisz, personal correspondence). 
Some of these will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five. 
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It is obvious that we cannot possibly change everything in our lives that we 
might wish to. There will always be things we cannot alter and which we will have to 
accept. Individuals are frequently confronted with the choice of either persisting at the 
impossible or accepting a situation as it is. Choice will inevitably involve both positive 
and negative consequences either way. When an individual relinquishes control, as 
opposed to attempting primary or secondary control, he simply gives up. Not only 
does he abandon the attempt to change his physical circumstances, he also makes no 
attempt to fit into the circumstances. Before the two process model, theorists believed 
that individuals frequently relinquished control. Rothbaum et al. propose that 
individuals only rarely give up completely. Behind the inward, passive behaviors 
associated with relinquished control are usually secondary control cognitions. 
Primary and secondary control processes frequently intertwine, and finding an 
optimal balance between them appears to be more adaptive than a reliance on either. 
Whether a person is using primary or secondary control strategies or relinquishing 
control depends on the person's reasons or goals for his behavior. This means that 
establishing reliable and valid classification presents particular difficulty because 
depending on direct observations or reports of behavior will not be sufficient (Weisz, 
1990). Despite the fact that the above model presently lacks sufficient empirical 
support, it offers an alternative to models which do not discuss control in 
uncontrollable situations. Having discussed the two process model, other similar 
perspectives by a wide range of psychological theorists will now be compared and 
contrasted with it. 
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In his 1984 dissertation on primary and secondary control processes as they 
apply to Type A coronary-prone behavior, Blackbum described the following similar 
approaches: 
Hartmann (1958) used the term alloplastic to refer to human action that adapts 
the environment to human functions and autoplastic to refer to secondary 
adaptations by the individual to the environments thus created. He stated that a 
mix of alloplastic and autoplastic actions was most adaptive. Thibaut and Kelly 
(1959) argued that in cases where external control is exercised over the 
individual by other persons or agencies, "the adaptive solution would seem to 
involve a recognition of external control and an acceptance of its indocility to his 
efforts: (p. 85). These authors went on to suggest that persons are especially 
sensitive to outcomes that fall within their range of control, thus enabling 
maximal recognition of potential control over the environment. (pp. 16-17) 
Mindfulness 
Previous to the development of the two process model, little attention had been 
paid to the importance of internal psychological realities in control strategies. Recently 
we have realized that the subject's internal processes, difficult as they might be to 
assess, are highly significant in any definition of control. Piper & Langer (1986) 
explained that, according to the mindfulness interpretation, control exists in a mutually 
defining relationship between the individual and the environment. It is the person's 
internal processes which anchor the relationship, and, therefore, control is less likely 
to be limited by external events or other persons. Langer (1989) states that when we 
perform daily activities in a repetitive, routinized manner, (i.e., arriving home without 
consciously remembering most of the drive), when we are being passively dependent 
or when we attribute all our troubles to a single cause (premature cognitive 
commitment), we are operating mindlessly. In the mindless state, we are vulnerable to 
making mistakes and less able to react swiftly, adaptively or creatively to changes in 
our environment. We are less aware of alternatives, and, therefore, less in control than 
we could be. 
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Mindfulness, on the other hand, is a state of alert awareness which renders us 
better able to react to and to appreciate the context in which we find ourselves. Langer 
believes that our cognitive capacity is not fixed but elastic, capable of growth. The 
ability to respond to incoming information is increased to the extent that one is 
mindful. From the perspective of the actor, giving up behavioral control may actually 
be perceived as exercising and possessing control. From this vantage point, the 
individual may mindfully examine various responses to determine which will most 
successfully reduce arousal. Such an understanding is not possible within the 
behavioral control model. 
Learned Helplessness 
When individuals learn that their voluntary behavioral responses do not affect 
objective reality - in other words, when they cannot exert primary control - they 
usually decrease the frequency of those responses. Seligman named this situation 
learned helplessness (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975). 
Although the contingency between the individual's actions and the outcome of an 
event is seen as the most salient feature of this theory, it still becomes a conceptual 
link between perceived control and the motivation to initiate voluntary action as a 
means of exercising control (Blackbum, 1984). Inward behaviors are seen, at least in 
part, as a motivational deficit (Seligman, 1975). In the two process model, the 
situation determines which form of control will be most efficacious. In situations that 
are uncontrollable, secondary control will be more adaptive than primary control or 
relinquished control. 
The reformulated learned helplessness theory suggests that when individuals are 
faced with uncontrollable, aversive events, they ask themselves why. Those who make 
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internal, stable and global attributions for failure suffer chronic and general feelings of 
helplessness with accompanying low self-esteem. Causal attributions have been made 
to limited ability, chance and powerful others. 
The two process model also predicts that these individuals will experience 
depression in situations of failure. However, their depression may not be as severe or 
long-lasting if they are able to use secondary control to mitigate their loss. Thus, some 
individuals who make internal, stable, and global attributions for failure may still (a) 
find meaning in the event, (b) derive a sense of control from having predicted the 
failure, (c) associate themselves with luck or (d) associate themselves with powerful 
others. 
Peterson & Seligman (1984) in a study of causal factors for depression stated 
that "there are cognitive factors not included in helplessness theory that determine 
responses to uncontrollable bad events including ... an individual's beliefs about the 
consequences of uncontrollable events" (p. 111). Thus, helplessness theorists have 
noted the importance of secondary control. 
Locus of Control 
Another theory which associates perceived uncontrollability with passive, 
withdrawn behaviors comes from locus of control studies. In this formulation, 
internals are individuals who believe that they primarily control the occurrence of 
positive and negative reinforcements in their lives. Externals, on the other hand, 
believe that reinforcing events are due to luck, chance or powerful others and are, in 
general, more likely to manifest depressive symptoms and inward behaviors. This 
difference leads internals and externals to make systematically different causal 
attributions. Externals do not necessarily perceive themselves as powerless, however. 
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Cherulink & Citrin (1974) concluded that externals simply pursue power in a different 
way. Aligning themselves with luck or chance (illusory control) or powerful others 
(vicarious control) would seem to be likely alternate ways for externals to avoid 
feeling powerless. 
Rothbaum et al. (1982) state that some of the most compelling behavioral 
evidence of striving for interpretive control may come from the external's tendency to 
alter individual desires and values so that they fit more closely the probable outcome 
of a situation. Kenney (1987) seems to agree with that possibility when he states the 
following: 
a. externals more often express a preference for chance tasks compared to 
internals (DuCette & Wolk, 1973; Kahle, 1980); b. externals perceive failure at 
chance tasks as a loss of control; c. persons making external attributions at times 
seem to evidence better adjustment (DesPeres, 1976; Felton & Kahana, 1974; 
Frankl, 1963). Thus, it seems plausible to consider that externals may view 
association with chance events as an alternative form of control and that the use 
of this form of control may lead to better adjustment in certain situations. (p. 30) 
This theory also has its limitations. Rotter's locus of control scale consists of a 
number of control-related beliefs rather than the single dimension he had originally 
proposed. The scale may also be more valid for white middle-class subjects than for 
minority or lower socioeconomic class subjects (Gurin, Gurin, Lao, & Beattie, 1969; 
Phares, 1976; see also Strickland, 1978). Further, the internal locus of control items 
assess both effort (controllable) as well as ability (uncontrollable) which confounds 
locus and controllability (Weiner, 1986). 
Both helplessness and locus of control models define control as the ability to 
respond in a way that will bring about a change in the environment. If only the 
behaviors which an experimenter can see are important, these theorists must conclude 
that when a subject exhibits passivity or withdrawal he must have passed control to 
external sources (locus of control) or relinquished control (helplessness). What these 
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theories do not address is the powerful motivation individuals have to maintain 
control. Rothbaum et al. (1982) state that the "motivation to feel 'in control' may be 
expressed not only in behavior that is blatantly controlling but also, subtly, in behavior 
that is not" (p. 7). Furthermore, the authors go on to suggest that inward behaviors 
(submissiveness, withdrawal, passivity) are often associated with secondary control 
rather than relinquished control. Rothbaum et al. suggest that the reason secondary 
control has not been noted by these authors is that there have been few attempts to 
measure it. Kenney (1987) found two studies (Cherulink & Citrin, 1974; Peterson & 
Seligman, 1984) which seem to indicate that locus of control and helplessness 
theorists are beginning to address secondary control as an important factor. 
Sttess and Copin~ Paradi~m 
The concept of control is often used in a manner similar to the concept of coping 
(Blackburn, 1985; Langer, 1983; Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Lazarus 
and his associates do not refer to coping as an outcome, as in popular usage, but as a 
process of "constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific 
external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the 
resources of the person" (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 141). These authors believe 
that individuals appraise personal control in the context of a dynamic relationship 
between the person and her environment which is constantly changing as the person 
and the environment act on each other (Folkman, 1984). Lazarus believed that in 
appraisal individuals evaluate events according to how salient they are to the 
individual's well being. This cognitive process is not necessarily "conscious, verbal, 
deliberate, or rational" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and may change several times during a 
stressful encounter. 
According to this paradigm individuals determine the meaning of an event 
through two types of cognitive appraisal. Primary appraisal involves a judgment 
regarding how relevant the situation or event is to the individual. Primary appraisals 
are mainly action-oriented and emotionally primitive as the individual reacts to loss, 
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threat, challenge or a combination of the above. An event which affects an 
individual's commitments to values, ideals or goals will be evaluated as more 
significant to that person's well being and, therefore, more stressful. In fact, the more 
deeply held the commitments involved in a situation the more important it may be for 
the individual to perceive himself in control over its outcome (Folkman, 1984). 
Generalized beliefs about control such as internal or external locus of control 
influence primary appraisal. Folkman (1984) makes a distinction between generalized 
control beliefs and control as coping by stating the following: 
Generalized beliefs about control and control appraisals are cognitive factors that 
influence the appraisal of threat or challenge in a particular stressful encounter; 
control as a coping process refers to cognitive and/or behavioral efforts to 
exercise or seek control in that same encounter (see also Wong & Sproule, 
1983). (p. 844) 
Secondary appraisal involves decisions and emotions about options, resources 
and abilities for responding to the event -in other words, how to cope with the 
situation. The individual goes through a complex, dynamic and multifaceted 
assessment of her psychological, physical, social and material resources for handling a 
particular situation (Folkman, 1984). The appraisal attempts to answer questions such 
as the following: How much of the situation can the individual control? What is it he 
is exercising control over? How might an appraisal of coping change with new 
information? 
Lazarus then divided coping into two types: problem-focused and emotion-
focused. Problem-focused coping is similar to primary control in that it is an attempt 
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to change the person-environment situation through problem-solving, decision making 
or direct action. Emotion-focused coping, like secondary control, relates to the 
regulation of distressing emotion. Individuals usually employ both forms of coping in 
varying proportions in stressful events, but Folkman (1984) suggests that the 
effectiveness of problem-focused behavior is dependent on the success of emotion-
focused strategies. "Otherwise, heightened emotions will interfere with the cognitive 
activity necessary for problem-focused coping" (p. 845). The examples Folkman gives 
of emotion-focused coping sound very much like secondary control strategies: (a) 
devaluing the stakes that are at risk in an encounter, (b) focusing on the positive 
aspects of negative outcomes, and ( c) engaging in positive comparisons. In discussing 
secondary control, she calls it "a form of emotion-focused coping that enhances 
perceptions of control in ostensibly uncontrollable situations" (p. 844) and refers to it 
as "defensive reappraisal." 
In a comparison of the two process model to that of Lazarus and Folkman, 
Kenney (1987) wrote the following: 
... Lazarus & Folkman attempted to separate appraisal from coping (control). 
Within the two-process model, it seems plausible that the meaning one derives 
from a situation (interpretive control) and what one predicts to happen in a 
situation (predictive control) may be part of an appraisal process. For example, if 
an individual predicts that he will fail an exam and accepts this by saying 
"everyone does poorly on exams once in awhile, I'll do better next time," this 
would seem to be an integral part of the controVcoping process. In this example, 
the individual would seem to be decreasing an appraisal of loss or threat and 
increasing the appraisal of the situation as benign. Viewing appraisal as a form 
of controVcoping may serve to highlight its importance in dealing with the 
environment and oneself. (p. 15) 
Assimilation and Accommodation. 
Rothbaum et al. (1982) have noted the similarity between primary and secondary 
control and the Piagetian concepts of assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation 
involves the individual imposing his existing schema on new situations or ideas in 
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order to fit his needs. He attempts to change outside reality by forcing it into his 
preconceived notions, just as in primary control the individual attempts to change 
outside reality with direct action. Accommodation involves modifying one's existing 
schema to incorporate new knowledge thereby bringing oneself into line with a new 
reality or idea. Both accommodation and secondary control usually involve change 
within the individual. Accommodation involves changing the individual's schema 
while secondary control involves changing the individual's desires. 
There appear to be other similarities between the two process model and Piaget's 
process of adaptation through accommodation, assimilation, and equilibration (the 
biological and psychological balance the organism continually strives for). Both 
theories stress that their two processes always work together in complementary 
fashion. In fact, a reliance on one process over the other can be indicative of 
pathological functioning (Piaget, 1983; Rosen, 1985; Rothbaum et al., 1982). The 
primary difference between the two models may be that the two process model deals 
with control while the Piagetian model deals with schema. Since these are different 
constructs, there may not always be a high correlation between the occurrence of each 
type of control and each type of schema (Kenney, 1987). 
Kenney (1987) contrasts Piaget's and Rothbaum et al.'s approaches this way: 
This difference becomes apparent when one considers how accommodation or 
assimilation may be at work in situations of primary or secondary control. For 
example, when a person cuts in front of you on the highway, you may deal with 
this using primary control by honking your horn and trying to get him to change 
his behavior. This may involve using your existing assimilative schema by 
thinking of the driver as similar to other rude and inconsiderate drivers. Also, 
you may notice an out-of-state license plate and use an accommodative schema 
by changing your view of him versus other rude and inconsiderate drivers. For 
instance, you may think, "This person is not only rude and inconsiderate, he also 
doesn't know where he is going." So in this situation, the individual used 
primary control but used both assimilation and accommodation. In a similar 
situation, someone may cut in front of you and you may use secondary control 
by thinking, "Well, sometimes I'm in a hurry, too." If this is a new way of 
thinking about this situation, accommodation has occurred. If you are in the 
habit of accepting persons occasionally cutting in front of you on the highway, 
the above process may be assimilative. As seen in the above example, then, 
one's method of control can be accommodative or assimilative or both. 
Conceptually, one's method of control does not necessitate the change of 
knowledge structure (schema) or the maintenance of knowledge structure. (pp. 
22-23) 
Summary 
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Control can be conceived of as an appraisal process and as a coping process. As 
such, the two process model is quite similar to Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) view of 
the appraisal and coping process. However, primary, secondary and relinquished 
control differ from these authors' concepts of emotion-focused and problem-focused 
coping in that emotion-focused coping incorporates aspects of both primary and 
secondary control (Kenney, 1987). 
The present view of control is different from notions of control in learned 
helplessness theory and locus of control theory. These theories typically recognize 
primary control as the only means of avoiding perceptions of uncontrollability. They 
see passive, withdrawn behaviors as signs of relinquished control whereas Rothbaum 
et al. believe that the motivation for control is so strong that the occurrence of 
relinquished control is very rare. Instead, individuals will attempt to maintain a 
perception of control by switching to secondary control processes. How primary and 
secondary control processes develop over an individual's life span will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROL 
PROCESSES OVER THE LIFE SPAN 
For infants, loud cries usually produce an adult to care for their needs. Adults 
have the ability and the physical and intellectual resources to provide most things for 
themselves. In old age, however, as our abilities decline and our resources wane, we 
may again need an adult to take care of us, but this time we must use a call button to 
summon her. 
There is growing evidence that the structure of control-related beliefs changes 
over the life cycle. Weisz (1983) has argued that in order to judge the amount and type 
of control we can exert in a situation, we must accurately gauge the degree to which 
the target outcome can be influenced by variations in people's behavior (a contingency 
judgment), we must correctly assess our level of competence to produce the behavioral 
variations on which the target outcome is contingent (a competence judgment), and we 
must combine the contingency and competence judgments in a logical manner. Our 
ability to do those complex calculations is affected by our developmental stage. 
Before exploring how perceived control in general, and primary and secondary control 
in particular, change over the life span, a brief discussion of contingency and 
competence is appropriate. 
Contin&ency 
During a storm, preschool children often sing, "Rain, rain, go away; come again 
some other day." If the rain actually stops, they will be convinced it was because they 
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sang. Sometimes the environment appears to give us evidence of our ability to cause 
events which are, in fact, not in our control. Several authors have stated that an 
illusion of control may be characteristic of much adaptive human functioning (Taylor 
& Brown, 1988). Many times there simply is not enough information to assess 
accurately whether or not there is contingency. A child's illusion of control would 
involve the erroneous belief that she could produce a positive outcome when no such 
contingency existed. This would seem to be the opposite of Seligman' s notion of 
learned helplessness, the erroneous belief that one has no control to affect the outcome 
of a given event when contingency does in fact exist between response and outcome 
(Langer, 1983). 
Competence 
Children may also need to be at a certain point developmentally before they can 
make accurate assessments of their own competency to produce the outcomes they 
want. Weisz (1983) submits that by middle to late childhood, children may have 
developed cognitively so that there are necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
veridical control judgments. Bandura' s ( 1981) theoretical account of the 
developmental course of self-efficacy may be helpful in understanding this concept. 
Bandura states that infants develop a "sense of personal agency" as they realize their 
ability to produce effects on the physical and social world. As they get older, children 
use their peer relations and rate of success with academic and cognitive tasks in school 
to hone their assessments of their competence. Adults have ample opportunities to 
gauge their competence in their marital and family relationships and careers and, as 
their assessments become more realistic, may become painfully aware of the 
limitations of their abilities. Because of social stereotypes, among other reasons, the 
elderly frequently underestimate their competence in many important areas. 
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Our ability to judge the amount of control we have in situations has important 
implications for us. There will be circumstances in our lives which are undesirable but 
unchangeable. Continuing to use primary control strategies in those circumstances will 
most likely produce frustration and helplessness. On the other hand, our ability to 
judge an outcome as noncontingent may help us to abandon the use of primary control 
in favor of secondary control. Not only will we discontinue expending effort uselessly, 
we may find meaning or purpose in those unalterable circumstances which may be 
helpful for ourselves and others. 
Infancy 
Unfortunately, infants cannot tell us whether or not they ever shift into using 
secondary control when their primary control attempts fail, and there is no way to 
ascertain this by observation. There has been some work on the development of 
control during the first twelve months, however. Gunnar (1982), in a literature review, 
found evidence that indicated that children 1-4 months old begin and end interactions 
with significant adults, thereby exercising a degree of control. Also, 2-4-month-olds 
showed distress when adult caregivers did not respond when the baby looked directly 
at or away from them. Infants appear to be able to learn to produce behavior which has 
been associated with certain pleasurable outcomes under careful experimental 
conditions. For instance, inf ants as young as 2 months of age who are exposed to 
response-contingent reinforcement (e.g., movements of a mobile triggered by the 
infant's head movements) appear to become functionally aware of the contingency 
(Suomi, 1981). This seems to support Watson's (1971) contention that contingency 
analysis begins at the age of about 8-to-12- weeks. 
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At 4 to 8 months, Gunnar found that the infant becomes "an active agent in 
producing stimulation" (p. 4). When an action brings about some interesting outcome, 
the infant repeats it. His awareness of limits on his ability to control appears to begin 
at 8 to 12 months. He begins to be afraid of strangers as he realizes that people are not 
as easily controlled as physical objects. By the age of 12 months, the distress the 
infant shows at being presented with a potentially frightening toy can be reduced by 
giving her the opportunity to exert control over it. 
Early Childhood Throu~h Adolescence 
Much more is known about children's control-related beliefs once they become 
verbal. Weisz (1983, 1986a & b, and 1990) and his colleagues have conducted both 
laboratory and field studies on the development of children's contingency reasoning 
by exposing them to outcomes which are either contingent (skill tasks) or 
noncontingent (games of chance). When asked to explain what caused their own or 
another person's outcomes, most of the children (5-13-year-olds) had some awareness 
of what the term "control" meant, for the most part using the term in three ways: 
Control over inanimate objects, interpersonal control and self-control. 
Children below age 7 generally failed to distinguish between contingent 
outcomes and chance outcomes. For the most part they attributed the outcomes to 
contingent events (i.e., "I didn't try hard enough") (Weisz, 1980, 1981; Weisz, Yeates, 
Robertson & Beckham, 1982). On the other hand, late-elementary-school or older 
children were usually able to recognize the chance outcomes as being noncontingent. 
Weisz (1983) concluded that the ability to distinguish between contingent and 
noncontingent events began to emerge at around the sixth year and that it was rather 
firmly in place by adolescence. 
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Compas, Banez, Malcarne, & Worsham (1991) suggested that developmental 
changes in control-related beliefs depend on the characteristics of tasks and the types 
of cognitive skills necessary to understand those tasks. They state that children move 
from overestimating contingency at age 6 to more realistic assessments by about age 
11. During this time, they also begin to recognize the possibility of an uncontrollable 
internal cause, and they show a decrease in attributions to external factors such as luck 
and powerful others. However, mean levels of contingency, competence, and control 
beliefs do not tend to change substantially with age. 
At the same time children believe that they can stop the rain by singing and that 
the moon follows them around, they also believe they can drive a car and build a 
working space ship. Fortunately for parents, it appears that levels of perceived 
competence may grow increasingly more realistic with development. Weisz reported 
in two studies (Weisz, 1977; Weisz & Achenbach, 1975) that, when he asked children 
to rate how competent they were compared to others in their school at a concept-
formation task, their self-ratings declined significantly with increasing mental age. IQ 
made no difference (Weisz, 1983). These findings are similar to several other studies 
(Nicholls, 1978; Freedman, 1975; Phillips, 1963). 
Further evidence was found by Stipek & Weisz (1981) who compared self-
ratings with teacher classifications by increasing grade level. She found that second 
and third graders' self-ratings were significantly related to where their teachers had 
placed them in class rankings (i.e., top versus bottom third of the class). By contrast 
kindergartners and first graders placed themselves considerably high regardless of 
whether their teachers had rated them within the upper or lower third. 
Schulz, Heckhausen, and Locher (1991) provide us with a useful summary of the 
development of primary control, contingency and competence in childhood: 
27 
Early development is characterized by an increasing ability to exert primary 
control over the environment. One of the hallmarks of biological and social 
development in early childhood is the increasing ability to produce behavior-
event contingencies. The action-outcome experiences of the child provide the 
basis for the development of self-competence, including generalized 
expectancies of control and perceptions of self-efficacy. As development 
progresses, children attain the capacity to differentiate competence into ability 
and effort, and develop domain-specific expectations for control - that is, 
individuals begin to select the domains of their life in which they will invest 
their highest expectancies for control, e.g., sports, career, family (Heckhausen & 
Schulz, 1990). (p. 181) 
If judgments of contingency and competence are affected by development, it 
would seem logical that secondary control may be as well. To test this hypothesis, 
Brotman-Band and Weisz (1988) asked 6-, 9-, and 12-year-olds to describe stressful 
episodes they had experienced and their behavior and goals during those episodes. 
Their responses were coded for primary, secondary or relinquished control. Lazarus 
and Folkman's (1984) Ways of Coping Checklist was also used. The authors found 
that, as with adults, there was a very low frequency of relinquished control. Reports of 
secondary control coping (alone or in combination with primary control coping) 
increased with age, whereas reports involving only the use of primary coping declined 
with age. 
In another study, Brotman-Band (1989) interviewed 8-year-old and 14-year-old 
children with juvenile diabetes about the particular stresses they experienced. These 
children could not change the fact of having diabetes but were required to perform 
several primary control behaviors to deal with it such as giving themselves insulin 
injections. Again, relinquished control was rare with the 8-year-olds relying on 
primary control goals significantly more than the older group. An interesting finding 
was that scores reflecting greater reliance on secondary control goals were associated 
with poorer physician's ratings of medical adjustment. Evidently, broad use of 
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secondary control can be analogous to declines in appropriate primary control - such 
as precise adherence to an appropriate diet and the prescribed medical regimen. 
In an exploratory study, Cameron (1984) administered her Children's Primary-
Secondary Control Scale to 95 fifth and sixth graders. She found that a strong 
emphasis on primary control may be associated with undesirable behaviors at home or 
in school. Those few children who relinquished control also showed poorer school 
achievement and more behavior problems than those who used more secondary 
control strategies. Cameron concluded that secondary control strategies may be more 
adaptive for children in school and home settings than primary or relinquished control. 
Weisz (1986b) speculated that children are expected to comply with rules and give in 
to authority in school and home settings. Therefore, actively pursuing primary control 
may take the form of disobeying or defiance, which would generally be maladaptive. 
Yielding because the child has given up could lead to feelings of helplessness, which 
would also be maladaptive and likely jeopardize achievement. If the child can retain a 
sense of control by using secondary control strategies in those situations where she 
must comply, there may be fewer negative correlates. 
Weisz (1990) has speculated on the reasons that secondary control responses 
may emerge somewhat later in development than primary control responses. On a 
practical level, cognitions are not observable, and, therefore, children cannot learn 
them through observation. As children mature and find that primary control does not 
always bring the results they wish, they may begin to question their illusions of 
control. Eventually, they may turn to secondary control strategies as a means of 
retaining some measure of control. Weisz (1990) suggests the following: 
... Secondary control goals may be more likely to be included among coping 
objectives (a) when the individuals doing the coping are relatively mature 
cognitively, (b) when the stressful situations involved place limits on the 
possibility of primary control, and (c) particularly when both (a) and (b) hold 
true. (p. 129) 
Rosenberg (1990) suggested that younger children may not have developed 
enough awareness of their thoughts and feelings to use one to regulate the other. He 
quotes Piaget (1951) saying " .. .in virtue of his very ego-centrism, the child is not 
conscious of his own thought ... " (p. 179). Without the resources to use secondary 
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control strategies, the child may be forced to rely on primary control just at a time in 
his life when he is least competent to act on the world directly. Being unable to judge 
contingency accurately may lead to depression in children who are not sure whether a 
failure event is their own fault or whether or not to persist at a task. According to 
Wiesz, Weiss, Wasserman, and Rintoul (1987), therapists could help children to 
identify causes of both failure and success as part of their treatment for depression. 
Adulthood 
The next chapter of this paper will examine studies of primary and secondary 
control strategies as they pertain to cultural and religious differences as well as health 
outcomes of adults. Therefore, the discussion of adults in this section will be limited to 
developmental issues. One of the tasks of adulthood is to further define perceptions of 
control. The uncontrollability theorists would argue that adults conceptualize an 
adaptive level of perceived control in terms of primary control alone. Rothbaum et al. 
(1982), however, suggest that adaptiveness is a matter of knowing how and when to 
exert primary or secondary control and how to integrate the two. 
Weisz (1983) has suggested that although most studies confound competence 
and contingency, it appears that, in general, adults are overly optimistic about their 
competence and see contingency where none exists (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; 
Langer, 1975,1977; Brim, 1980). According to Schulz, et al. (1991), over time 
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individuals get better at assessing what they can and cannot accomplish within one life 
span. They seem to prefer primary to secondary control processes, but begin to use 
increasingly more secondary control strategies as their physical abilities diminish 
with age. 
Believing oneself to be more responsible for and competent to handle situations 
than is the case has both advantages and negative consequences. Being overly 
optimistic may contribute to the decision to persist in an effort long enough to succeed 
at it. On the other hand, if that effort is beyond one's capabilities or impossible, the 
effort is wasted and the individual will experience failure with its usual consequence 
of diminished self esteem. 
Langer (1975, 1977) has suggested that people may perceive contingencies 
where none exist in order to avoid the anxiety and depression that accompany 
uncontrollability. She states that the degree of this illusion of control is influenced by 
the following factors: (a) perceived competence of a competitor on a task (even when 
the task is chance-related), (b) having a choice or selection, (c) being familiar with the 
situation, or (d) increasing concentration on the event. Subjects may attempt to obtain 
control through superstitious factors (e.g. blowing on dice before throwing them), or 
by aligning themselves with a chance event (e.g. valuing a familiar lottery number 
more than an unfamiliar one). What these factors have in common is that they increase 
the involvement of the participant through either behavioral or cognitive means. 
Langer and Roth (1975) found that those who predicted the outcomes of a coin toss (a 
chance event) rated themselves significantly higher in competence than those students 
who merely observed. The authors suggested that the students who were more 
involved in the event exhibited more illusion of control. These young, presumably 
intelligent, adults illogically misjudged that their competence had an effect ona 
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noncontingent event. Langer's illusion of control parallels illusory secondary control 
in the two process model. Rothbaum et al. (1982) agree that when people misperceive 
chance-determined events as skill-determined, their involvement in that chance 
situation, and thus their perception of alignment with chance (illusory secondary 
control), increases with the passage of time. 
There has been some work on which individuals in what situations are most 
likely to maintain an illusion of control. If people realistically identify factors such as 
chance and luck as being in control of outcomes, but somehow believe that they can 
influence chance or luck, they may experience repeated failure in an inherently 
uncontrollable world. In a study of 204 female college students, Schmitz (1987) 
administered the Attributional Style Questionnaire, the Beck Depression Inventory, 
Levenson' s I, P, and C Scales, the Life Events Questionnaire, the MMPI, Rotter's 
Internal-External Locus of Control Measure, the Tennessee Self Concept Scale and the 
Student Primary-Secondary Control Preference Scale developed by Blackburn (1984). 
Information regarding women's causal attributions for negative and positive events 
was not found to be of assistance in making predictions about depression or self-
esteem deficits, but information regarding their beliefs about control and recent life 
experiences was. Level of perceived competence was the most effective means of 
distinguishing between people on the basis of depression. Contingency beliefs were 
less relevant to depression, but very related to self-esteem. Abramson and Sackheim 
( 1977) called the process of being able to identify noncontingency of outcomes, while 
still attributing responsibility to the self, the "depressive paradox." 
If "depression is the common cold of psychopathology," as Seligman (1973, p. 
43) has suggested, then most adults will be subject to it to some degree at some time 
or another. Seligman and other learned helplessness theorists have suggested that 
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depressed people underestimate the contingency between outcomes and their behavior 
(Alloy & Seligman, 1978). Alloy & Abramson (1979), however, in a seminal study, 
found that depressives view the contingency of their outcomes realistically, and it is 
the nondepressed who show distorted contingency judgment. Evidence suggests that 
individuals who score high in desire for control demonstrate a greater illusion of 
control (Burger, 1986; Burger & Cooper, 1979), but low desired control scores 
correlate with depression (Burger, 1984). 
Learned helplessness theorists see depression as a behavioral manifestation of 
perceived uncontrollability. Rothbaum et al. (1982) argue that the passivity and 
perceived lack of effort shown by some subjects may be a reflection of the subjects' 
attempts to excuse failure. They refer to Frankel and Snyder's (1978) theory that 
withdrawal and passivity reflect a desire to minimize or diffuse failure on a task 
thereby preserving self-esteem and a sense of control. An induced helplessness 
procedure (which makes primary control ineffective) may temporarily lower subjects' 
self-esteem, resulting in a switch to predictive secondary control in order to avoid the 
disappointment of failure. By deliberately sabotaging success at a task, the subject is 
able to predict the outcome and therefore feels in more control of it. 
Berglas and Jones (1978; Jones & Berglas, 1978) state that the burden of feeling 
responsible for success or failure, despite perceiving that the task is noncontingent, 
sometimes motivates individuals to adopt a self-handicapping strategy. The authors 
describe a self-handicapping behavior as one that allows the individual to externalize 
failure and internalize success. In other words, these individuals perceive that they 
have no control over a task but that they are doomed to failure. They then sabotage 
their efforts in order to maintain their self-esteem by blaming their success or failure 
on external, specific, unstable factors. An individual who relinquishes control, yet 
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maintains that he has control of the situation, despite knowing that the results are due 
to chance or luck, is demonstrating illusory secondary control. 
Uncontrollability theorists cannot explain why depressed subjects continue self-
defeating behaviors even after success experiences (see e.g., Beck, 1967). According 
to the two process model, however, this phenomenon is explained by predictive 
secondary control. Depressed subjects may have had repeated past failures in which 
they have attempted to minimize disappointment by expecting failure rather than 
"getting their hopes up." If they were to acknowledge a success and change their 
actions accordingly, the viability of a predictive secondary control strategy would be 
compromised. If they were to begin to hope, disappointment would be even greater 
when they failed in the future than if they had predicted failure from the start. 
A study conducted by Burger and Arkin (1980) yielded results consistent with 
this theory. This study examined the effects of perceived (primary) control and 
predictability of an aversive event on depressive affect and subsequent performance of 
a memory task. The uncontrollable-unpredictable group performed significantly worse 
on the memory task and reported more depression than the control group. The authors 
concluded that "the perception of control or predictability concerning the aversive 
event was thus sufficient to mitigate learned helplessness, suggesting the functional 
equivalence of perceived control and predictability" (p. 482). 
Further support that nondepressed adults display an illusion of control, but that 
depressed adults do not, comes from Golin, Terrell, Weisz & Prost (1979) and Golin, 
Terrell, & Johnson (1977). In the first study, depressed subjects were shown to have 
more confidence in a low-illusion condition (experimenter threw the dice in a dice 
game) than in a high-illusion condition (subject threw the dice). Nondepressives had 
more confidence in their own dice throws than the experimenter's. In the second 
. .. ~ 
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study, Golin replicated these findings for a more severely depressed population. 
According to the two process model, the depressives appear to be aligning themselves 
with the experimenter, thereby displaying vicarious secondary control. The 
nondepressives attempt to demonstrate primary control by throwing the dice 
themselves in hopes of influencing the outcome. Weisz (1983) speculated that since 
the nondepressed subjects had the illusion of competence and contingency (illusory 
secondary control) they felt more confident when they were throwing the dice. Since 
depressed subjects have lower estimates of their competence, they may have felt more 
confidence in the experimenter's "ability" to throw the dice. Weisz points out the 
interesting deduction that the depressed subjects mistakenly believed they were less 
competent than the experimenter, and the nondepressed subjects mistakenly believed 
they were more competent than the experimenter, on a task which was entirely 
uncontrollable. 
Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton (1980) found that depressed subjects 
made much more veridical judgments about their own social competence than did 
either disturbed or nondisturbed control subjects who were not depressed. Although 
the realism of the depressed group declined over a course of treatment, they still 
viewed themselves as less competent socially than the nondepressed did. Lewinsohn et 
al., (1980) suggested the possibility that nondepressed people exhibit an illusory glow 
of exaggerated perceptions of personal competence. Weisz (1983) hypothesized that 
one possible causal pattern might be that this warm glow leads to a selective focus on, 
and memory for, an individual's positive attributes and accomplishments, thereby 
sustaining positive self-perceptions and positive mood. This would seem to be an 
example of selective attention secondary control. 
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Secondary selective attention may be more adaptive than is generally realized. 
From a study which had subjects complete a life events inventory, the Beck 
Depression Scale and the Repression-Sensitization Scale, Neiswender (1991 ) reports 
that: 
The results indicated that the most effective copers (as measured by depression 
scores) were those who used repression or denial to cope with recent life events. 
This is similar to work by Miller, Leinbach, & Brody (1989) and Miller, Brody, 
and Summerton (1988). (p. 14) 
Although there have been many studies reporting that individuals who perceive 
themselves to have low subjective primary control are depressed, having primary 
control may sometimes lead to negative reactions as well. Miller (1980) found that 
subjects, when given a choice to yield control of electric shocks to a yoked partner, 
were less anxious than those who retained control. Rodin, Rennert & Solomon (1980) 
found that subjects given a choice of which personality test to take or permission to 
ask questions during an interview reported lower self-esteem on a subsequent task 
than those subjects who were not given choices. In a field study, Mills and Krantz 
(1979) manipulated primary control by allowing subjects to choose the arm from 
which they wanted blood drawn. The experimenters also manipulated secondary 
control by giving some subjects more information about the procedure. The subjects 
who were given a choice and more information reported more anxiety than those 
subjects who were not given a choice. If there are individual differences in style of 
control, some subjects may prefer a secondary control process rather than a primary 
control process, in which case these results make more sense. In the Miller (1980) 
study, the subjects who yielded control may have been selecting their preferred control 
process (i.e., vicarious secondary control) and therefore experienced a reduction in 
anxiety. The subjects who maintained control also selected their preferred style of 
control, but did so at the cost of being responsible, and possibly experiencing more 
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self-blame, for shocks both to themselves and the other subject. Thus, the subject who 
retained control over the shock may have experienced less anxiety if he was not also 
responsible for the other person's well-being. 
The evidence for gender differences in preference for primary or secondary 
control are equivocal. Blackburn (1984) found no sex differences when he 
administered the Student Primary and Secondary Control Preference Scale to college 
students even though he was investigating the differences between Type A and Type 
B personality styles. His results support Gaeddert (1987) who found that students' 
gender had little impact on their attributions. Ganong and Coleman (1987) found that 
males and females were equal in the degree they utilized active (primary control) or 
yielding (secondary control) methods of self-control. This finding corroborated 
Shapiro and Shapiro (1983). Cameron (1983) found no gender-related differences 
among 11- to 13-year-olds, although Band & Weisz (1988) report that boys and girls 
differ in how they choose to handle stress. When a difference is found it is usually that 
males show a preference for primary control while females favor secondary strategies 
(Cameron, 1983). In a German study, Brandtstadter, Krampen, & Greve (1987) 
examined self-corrective activities which they considered a form of secondary control. 
Females showed a stronger tendency toward self-corrective change than males. 
Support for Rothbaum et al.' s notion that a balance of primary and secondary 
control is most adaptive for adults is found in a study conducted by Coyne, Aldwith 
and Lazarus (1981). The subjects, middle-aged persons divided into depressed and 
nondepressed groups, provided interview and questionnaire data over the course of a 
year, describing stressful situations they had encountered and the thoughts and actions 
which they had used to cope. Unexpectedly, the depressed subjects used as much 
problem-focused (primary) coping as the nondepressed subjects. Although, they were 
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no more self-blaming than the nondepressed subjects, the depressed individuals were 
less likely to see their stressful situations as something to accept. 
Schmitz (1987) has posited that there may be a continuum in which efforts 
toward primary control may decline with decreased perceptions of competence. 
Secondary control may increase accordingly, as long as some belief in contingency 
persists. As people perceive outcomes to be more and more erratic and arbitrary, 
secondary control may give way to relinquished control. 
The major life events experienced by the elderly involve loss (Butler, 1975). At 
retirement an individual experiences a major loss of actual contingency in the world of 
work. Even her health is less dependent on primary control strategies such as diet, 
exercise, and moderation as biological systems begin to break down. If she is moved 
into an institution, she will experience an extreme loss of contingency as she must 
adjust herself to the institution's schedule of meals, visiting hours, bed- and even bath-
times rather than her own. She becomes infantilized as her everyday activities are 
conformed to the institution's bureaucratic rules. If she has been involuntarily 
relocated to the institution (as most nursing home residents are), she has an increased 
risk of morbidity and mortality (Aldrich and Mendkoff, 1963; Killiam, 1970). Weisz 
(1983) hypothesized that: 
If such declines in actual contingency are accompanied by increasingly 
depressed affect, and if depressed affect is associated with especially veridical 
judgments of actual contingency, the result may be a kind of downward spiral 
characterized by increasingly accurate perceptions of increasing noncontingent 
life events. In turn, there is often an increased dependency on others to meet 
one's needs in terms of activities of daily living .... A major developmental task 
for this age group is to strive to maintain some sense of mastery and control 
while accepting the inevitable losses that accompany aging. (p. 258-259) 
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Apathy and depressed affect are said to be disproportionately frequent among the 
aged, particularly the institutionalized aged (Langer, 1982; Schulz, 1980; Schulz & 
Brenner, 1977). Even if primary control is possible upon entering a nursing home, the 
patient is lulled into mindlessness (see Chapter Two) by the boring routine and 
predictability of the institution (Chanowitz and Langer, 1980). Generally, the resident 
has a choice between helplessness or secondary control. 
The two process model can help make sense of the relation between 
controllability and depression for older individuals. Because primary control is 
constrained by biological and environmental factors, secondary control becomes 
especially salient for the elderly. There is considerable evidence suggesting that 
seniors, especially those in institutions, perceive low levels of contingency (Langer, 
1981; Langer & Rodin, 1976) and perceived competence also declines. According to 
Brim (1974), acknowledging that many of one's dreams will never be realized, 
watching one's children become absorbed in their own lives and friends pass away, 
contemplating the inevitability of one's own death may begin in mid-life but reach a 
special intensity in old age. In light of these real and anticipated losses, predictability, 
finding meaning and purpose in life events (interpretive secondary control) and 
alignment with physicians, God and other powerful others (vicarious secondary 
control) can be especially useful for older adults. 
Irion (1988) interviewed 70 nursing home residents screened for absence of 
substantial cognitive impairment about their perceptions of control over meals, 
activities, privacy and schedule. She found that primary, secondary and relinquished 
control were significant predictors of outcomes over and above the effects of 
demographics or symptoms of aging or physical disability. Traditional control theory 
constructs did not add to the prediction of well-being once primary, secondary, and 
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relinquished control were considered. Irion concluded that "The unique contribution 
of two-process control constructs suggests that they are tapping another dimension of 
controllability that traditional models have not adequately captured" (p. 73). 
Schulz (1980) cited several laboratory studies (Dweck & Repucci, 1973; Hanusa 
& Schulz, 1977; Hiroto, 1974) which suggest that a lack of control is most devastating 
when it carries implications for the individual's competence or worth. Langer (1982) 
states that the elderly, particularly those in institutions, are particularly susceptible to 
this devastation since they perceive themselves as more incompetent than they 
actually are. She reviewed a number of studies which appear to show that mistaken. 
perceptions of incompetence can be induced by (a) being assigned a deprecating label 
such as "old" (b) being no longer able to engage in a task that one formerly engaged in 
but that is now engaged in by another (a job, in the case of the retired elderly), and (c) 
allowing someone else to help you (something that often occurs unnecessarily among 
the elderly). 
Taken from another perspective, Ziegler and Reid (1983) found that in their 79 
nursing home resident subjects, a greater desire for control was related to greater 
happiness and better health, though the authors did not posit a causal relationship. 
Desire for control in an environment which discourages autonomy can pose serious 
problems. Experiments with giving nursing home residents more control have had 
mixed results. Although most experimenters assume that more personal control will 
lead to positive consequences, interventions which seek to enhance personal autonomy 
sometimes backfire. If those interventions are removed from the institutional 
environment after the experiment, morbidity and mortality increase (Schulz and 
Hanusa, 1978). Failing to take into account the very real constraints imposed by the 
institution and the limited capacities of an older, unwell individual, the experimenter 
may, in seeking to increase autonomy, foster helplessness. Schulz (1980) suggests, 
"Manipulations that increase control and at the same time elevate feelings of 
competence should have a greater and a longer lasting positive impact than control-
enhancing interventions that do not affect competence attributions" (p. 272). 
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Weisz (1983) speculates that interventions designed to heighten perceived 
contingency among the elderly (e.g., Langer & Rodin, 1976; Schulz, 1976) may be 
more effective, especially in the long run, if they are compatible with the realities of 
the life situations of the individuals than if they represent more temporary, fleeting 
changes that are difficult to sustain after the experiment has been completed. Kuypers 
& Bengston (1973) argue for interventions that foster feelings of competence in 
social-role performance, personal mastery and inner control. Enhancing secondary 
control may be much more adaptive for seniors than attempts to increase primary 
control given the reality of fewer opportunities to exercise behavioral control. 
According to a literature review by White and Janson (1986), "Those most at risk for 
true helplessness are the depressed residents with the highest internal locus of control 
attempting to utilize primary control strategies" (p. 309). 
A finding which appears in several studies is that religious faith seems to be 
particularly salient among the aged. For example, Strickland and Shaffer (1971) 
found elders to be more internal and reported significant positive relations between 
age, internality and intrinsic religious stance. Koenig, George & Siegler, (1988) found 
that religious attitudes (i.e., faith or trust in God, strength derived from God, private 
prayer) and other intrapsychic and cognitive methods (i.e., acceptance, comparison of 
self to others) comprised the most predominant strategies that older individuals found 
effective in handling stress. 
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Shaw (1989) found in a study of coping and control in nursing home residents 
that secondary control was used when the amount of perceived control was low, and it 
was somewhat influential on coping effectiveness. She reported that in her interviews 
many of the residents said that prayer was their only means of dealing with living in a 
nursing home. Irion (1988) heard similar statements in her interviews. She writes, 
"For example, items intended to tap traditional intemality such as, 'When I get what I 
want, it's usually because I worked hard for it,' prompted comments such as, 'I pray a 
lot about it, and if it's God's will, I'll get it"' (p. 77). 
In a paper integrating theology and psychological theories, Spilka and Bridges 
(1989) seem to be speaking about the religious stance of nursing home residents when 
they write, "Theologically, the issue is that of salvation, understood here as salvation 
from meaninglessness to meaning, from an unhealthy self-image to a healthy one, and 
from helplessness to control" (p. 347). In an explanation of primary and secondary 
control strategies they list the following: 
(1) From an individual perspective in traditional religion, power and control are 
usually associated with prayer. Though prayer satisfies a number of motives, 
most people pray to effect some change in objective reality which will resolve a 
problem (Clark, 1958). The aspiration is primary control, but the outcome is not 
usually up to the individual. By engaging in prayer, the person feels more 
capable and has thus changed the self - inadvertently providing a secondary 
control function. 
(2) Though Ogden (1963) still looks to prayer's "ultimate significance, that it be 
heard by God" (p. 67), his accent is overwhelmingly on what prayer does for the 
person. Implied is the objective power of God, and hence we have a kind of 
vicarious control. Personal prayer gives the individual the feeling that the burden 
is now in the hands of God. There has been a transfer of power from the person 
of God, with the individual benefiting by gaining a sense of security that control 
is in the "best" hands. This is the language of secondary control. (p. 348) 
The authors write of the hope, engendered by religious faith, that predicting 
salvation and deliverance gives the supplicant. "Helplessness is thus countered, and 
immediate burdens are lightened" (p. 349). Felton and Kahana (1974) hypothesize that 
a belief in external control among institutionalized older adults may reflect their need 
to "seek out a champion ... , a mediator between the powerless self and the rigid 
institutional milieu" (p. 300). 
Summaiy 
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At different times over the life course, the issue of control and the related 
concept of autonomy (i.e., self reliance; the ability to function independently) become 
more or less salient. For example, according to Erikson's (1950) theory of psycho-
social development, young children learning to master their bodily functions and 
trying to assert their independence face the task of establishing a sense of autonomy 
versus one of shame and doubt. Again in adolescence and young adulthood, the 
individual is challenged to become more independent, establish a sense of identity, 
and make choices concerning the future (Erickson, 1968). Hence, for both the young 
child and the adolescent or young adult, asserting control over the environment and 
cultivating a sense of autonomy are key developmental processes. By contrast, older 
adults are faced with concerns such as retirement, widowhood, declining health and 
physical functioning (Bengston, 1973; Kuypers & Bengston, 1973). 
Aldwin & Revenson (1985) found that older adults perceive themselves as 
responsible for the occurrence of a stressful event less often than younger adults, but 
both groups took equal responsibility for managing the stressful event. Perhaps the use 
of secondary control is more characteristic of older individuals, especially in 
uncontrollable circumstances, and represents a developmental progression from young 
adulthood during which primary control is tantamount. Secondary control affords the 
individual in a highly constrained environment the opportunity to perceive some sense 
of control, whether it be through positive reappraisal (i.e., interpretive control), 
association with and trust in the staff, God or the physician (i.e., vicarious control), 
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belief in fate (i.e., illusory control) or restructuring expectations (i.e., predictive 
control). As individuals reach middle and old age, most cultures downplay attributes 
related to primary control, such as physical abilities, and emphasize attributes related 
to secondary control, such as wisdom (Sternberg, 1990). These prescriptions provide 
individuals with the opportunity to maintain a sense of equilibrium in the face of 
biological senescence (Schultz, et al. 1991 ). With the gradual erosion of primary 
control during the later years, Shultz, et al. (1991) suggest, comes the wisdom to 
"shuck off' some of the sense of responsibility for things we cannot change. In the 
light of these considerations, a question posed by the insightful folk psychologist 
Satchel Paige, quoted by Bandura (1981), is worth repeating: "How old would you be 
if you didn't know how old you was?" (Weisz, 1983, p. 277). 
Trillin (1981) quotes William Saroyon exercising secondary control by saying, 
"I'm growing old! I'm falling apart! And it's VERY INTERESTING!" Also very 
interesting is how the two process model is involved in health care. The next chapter 
will explore not only health care, but religion and culture which are even more 
interesting! 
CHAPTER FOUR 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROL 
IN HEAL TH, CULTURE AND RELIGION 
There are a myriad of arenas in which to study the two process model of 
perceived control, from romance to employee relations. In the last chapter, the 
development of the uses of primary and secondary control strategies was discussed. 
Although this concept is relatively new, and studies have just begun to scratch the 
surf ace, this chapter covers three fields where research has been most extensive. There 
is much overlap between health, religion and culture, so the boundaries between 
sections of this chapter are diffuse rather than rigid. 
Health 
People's perceptions of control over their health status can affect their behavior 
as well as the course of any illness. 
" ... Becoming ill can be a shock to a person's sense of security and to his or 
her self-image. Not only does it threaten the customary view of oneself, but it 
further underscores that one is indeed vulnerable (to illness, and perhaps then to 
other problems), that life is uncertain, that one may have little control over 
events ... " (Cohen and Lazarus, 1979, p. 218) 
Being injured in an accident, being hospitalized, developing a chronic illness all 
bring up primitive survival fears. The individual's basic assumptions about the world 
are shattered as he struggles with existential questions of purpose, mortality, 
vulnerability, loneliness. In fact, the onset of chronic illness is so stressful that 
Helgeson (1992) calls it a victimization experience. Because of their similarities, both 
health and victimization will be considered in this section. 
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Unexpected aversive events destroy our security in a just and predictable world. 
Wolfenstein (1957) notes that a disaster victim loses "confidence in his luck" (p. 159) 
fearing that now anything could happen. If an individual can regain a perception of 
control over future events, Taylor (1983) states that he will be able to believe that 
victimization is manageable or will not be repeated. Several authors have written that 
perceived control may positively affect health by increasing coping efforts and 
persistence, providing one with a positive self-image, and reducing distress (Bandura, 
1977; Lefcourt, 1976; Thompson, 1981). The complex interaction of perceived control 
and ill health appears to depend on the severity, duration and nature of the patient's 
problems, as well as individual differences between patients and even their cultures. 
The medical model has generally encouraged vicarious secondary control in 
patients. We go to physicians to be healed, and we expect them to offer some 
treatment (e.g., chemotherapy) or procedure (e.g., surgery) which will bring our 
bodies back to health. Although illusions of control are generally adaptive (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988), Taylor, Kemeny, Reed and Aspinwall (1991) suggest that those 
illusions need to operate within realistic boundaries to be adaptive. When there is little 
that can be done to cure a patient, as in the case of AIDS, a belief in vicarious control 
can be maladaptive (Reed, 1989). If family members are used as objects of vicarious 
control, males may exhibit distress. In a study of men with advanced heart disease 
(Dracup, Guzy, Taylor and Barry, 1986), those whose wives had been trained in CPR 
(and were thus capable of literally saving their husband's lives) were significantly 
more anxious than those whose wives had not been trained. 
Several studies have looked at the role of primary and secondary control 
strategies in Types A and B personalities. Since Type A behavior has been shown to 
lead to coronary heart disease (CHD), interventions for this group .are greatly needed. 
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The characteristic of Type As which Powell (1992) calls the "pathogenic core" is 
hostility, which is a stronger predictor of CHD than the Type A personality itself. The 
picture of Type As which emerges from the literature is characterized by mistrust. 
(Williams & Barefoot, 1988). Time urgency, excess drive, anger, impatience, 
passivity and depression were seen by Glass (1977) as signs that Type As were 
striving for control in the face of a challenging, and often unmalleable, environment. 
Price (1982) hypothesized that their hostility comes from the belief that life is unjust 
and chaotic, and their competitiveness from the belief one has to fight to get one's fair 
share of limited resources. Aggression, vengeance, low self-esteem and low perceived 
control are also important factors in the Type A makeup (Glass, 1977; Friedman & 
Ulmer, 1984). 
When Type A college students were compared to Type B students, Blackburn 
(1984) found that Type Bs valued primary control as much as As did. The difference 
seemed to be that Bs showed a greater preference for secondary control. Kenney 
(1987) found that Type As know about but do not use secondary control strategies in 
an adaptive, efficacious, and situationally appropriate manner. He agrees that As tend 
to try to control situations that are uncontrollable to a greater extent than Bs, and that 
Bs conversely are more likely to accept uncontrollable situations, frequently finding a 
way to avoid disappointment or to reinterpret the situation more positively, perhaps as 
bad luck (illusory secondary control). He also found, however, that As evidenced a 
significant use of secondary control. 
Brunson & Matthews (1981) found that when faced with a failure event, Type 
Bs attributed that failure to situational factors and disengaged from the task, but Type 
As attributed failure to dispositional factors and tried harder. This supports Powell's 
(1992) finding that Type As blame the environment for problems, but believe that the 
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environment can always be changed with persistence. Neibuhr's (1943) Serenity 
Prayer seems to have been especially written for Type As, "God grant me the courage 
to change what can be changed, serenity to accept what can't be changed, and wisdom 
to know the difference." In other words, "Help me know when to use primary or 
secondary control." 
Blackburn (1984) states that high hostility individuals, which would include 
most Type As, seem to prefer primary control more than low hostility individuals: 
It seems that an impatient, competitive person with an internal locus of control 
overly biased toward the exercise of primary control, and who was relatively 
unable to utilize secondary control, would naturally tend to be aggressive and 
hostile to the extent that desires for control were frustrated. From what we know 
of Type A, this composite psychological/behavior profile would seem to 
maximize the person's feeling of being at odds with the environment (including 
other people). The result would then be a tendency to experience the chronic 
stress that may be a factor in CHD development. (p. 94) 
Powell (1992) followed 591 post-myocardial infarction patients for 4.5 years as 
they were counseled regarding their basic attitude about the world. She encouraged 
both a belief in reciprocal determinism, which de-emphasizes blame and considers 
causes of problems from multiple perspectives, and a related belief that trying harder 
or longer will not always lead to desired results. Using cognitive restructuring 
interventions, Powell taught these patients to diminish their reactivity to minor 
stressors: 
We suggest to patients that these minor stressors are "hooks" and they are like 
fish swimming past as many as 30 hooks each day, each of which are inviting 
them to bite (i.e., to lose their tempers and become angry, impatient or irritated). 
We then invite patients to recognize "the hook" - that is, to switch the 
immediate perception of the stressor from "Unfair!" (which is accompanied by 
irritation or impatience) to "Hook!" (which is frequently accompanied by 
amusement.) In short, we seek a switch from primary to secondary control, that 
is, predictive secondary control in that they know in advance it is coming, even 
though they can't know exactly when. (p. 137) 
As her subjects improved at identifying "hooks" they reported greater feelings of 
self-control and self-efficacy. Powell's goal was to teach them versatility in choosing 
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between primary and secondary control strategies. Her CHO patients were also taught 
more effective primary control strategies which were not accompanied by as much 
emotional arousal as their past methods. The physiological results of Powell's study 
add an important dimension to our understanding of the two-process model: 
The use of secondary control may exert the same beneficial effects on 
physiology as those obtained by primary control. Direct primary control over 
pain has been associated with an increase in endogenous opioids (Bandura, 
O'Leary, Taylor, Gauthier & Gossard, 1987). But increased endogenous opioids 
also resulted from the use of vicarious secondary control which presumably was 
operating when subjects ingested a placebo painkiller (Grevert & Goldstein, 
1985). (p. 135) 
In a study of chronic pain sufferers, Mendola (1990) found that as the duration 
of the individual's pain increased, primary control appraisals were no longer 
beneficial. Related to this hypothesis is research which has found that, with increases 
in severity of the stressor, the adaptive value of primary control decreases (Affleck, 
Tennen, Pfeiffer, & Fifield, 1987). Severity of stressor may affect the effectiveness of 
secondary control as well. Mendola (1990) found predictive control was associated 
with more global psychological distress when his sample of chronic pain sufferers 
rated the severity of the pain as low and less at high levels of pain severity. In another 
study of coronary heart disease patients, Helgeson (1992) found that perceptions of 
vicarious control were related to better adjustment only for patients who had 
undergone invasive procedures by physicians. She states that perceived control will be 
most adaptive when the outcome is controllable and the threat is severe. 
Perhaps the most useful secondary control strategy for impaired health or bodily 
functioning is the derivation of meaning from the stressor, interpretive control. A 
growing body of research has documented the benefits that individuals construe from 
major medical problems (e.g., Affleck, Tennen, Crog & Levine, 1987; Affleck, 
Tennen & Gershman, 1985; Taylor, Collins, Skokan & Aspinwall, 1989; Tennen, et 
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al., 1991; Affleck, Pfeiffer, Tennen & Fifield, 1988). Construing benefits has been 
associated with emotional well-being among breast cancer patients (Taylor, Lichtman 
& Wood, 1984), mothers of seriously ill infants (Affleck, Allen, Tennen, McGrade & 
Ratzan, 1985) and infertile women (Tennen, Affleck & Mendola, 1991). Affleck, 
Tennen, Croog & Levine (1987) found that heart attack victims who derived benefits 
from their illness were less likely to have a subsequent heart attack over an eight-year 
period, and Affleck, Tennen, and Rowe (1991) reported that mothers who found 
benefits in their child's hospitalization on a newborn intensive care unit had children 
who developed more optimally two years later. Some common themes include that the 
illness strengthened family relationships and led to increased patience, tolerance, 
empathy, and courage as well as changes in values and priorities. 
Perloff (1983) suggests that before a serious health or victimization event occurs 
to us, most of us operate under an illusion of invulnerability, which may be similar to 
illusions of control. She suggests that illusions of unique invulnerability, the feeling 
that "it can't happen to me," may benefit nonvictims by keeping feelings of anxiety at 
a manageable level, promoting feelings of personal control, and allowing them to 
carry out everyday activities without being hypervigilant and eternally "on guard." 
Unfortunately, such illusions may also discourage us from taking adequate 
precautions such as wearing seat belts or not smoking, and make coping even more 
difficult after aversive events. According to Waister (1966), people do not want to 
believe that severe negative outcomes can happen randomly, since such a belief forces 
them to concede that an accident or misfortune could happen to them. To avoid facing 
such a frightening thought, nonvictims will often blame the victim and convince 
themselves that they are somehow different from, and more capable than, the victim 
(Perloff, 1983). 
Silver, Boon & Stones (1983) state that finding meaning in the case of incest, 
where the victim is chronically abused and powerless, or in situations which are 
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judged to be particularly unfair, may be especially difficult. Some victims of rape 
react by "living dangerously" (Scheppele and Bart, 1983) which Peterson & Seligman 
(1983) suppose may be an attempt at secondary control. Seeking meaning in isolation 
may be especially challenging as in being the victim of socially unacceptable behavior 
(incest, rape, death of loved one by suicide). Silver et al. studied 77 women whose 
incest had terminated an average of 20 years previously. They found that if, after an 
extended period, the search for meaning fails to bring understanding, continuing the 
process of searching and repeatedly ruminating appears to be maladaptive. The 
women who had been able to make sense of their experience reported less 
psychological distress, more self-esteem, better social adjustment and greater 
resolution of the experience than the women who were still searching for meaning. 
The research of Witenberg, Blanchard, Suls, Tennen, McCoy & McGoldrick 
(1983) and Tennan et al. (1984), suggests that finding meaning in a chronic medical 
illness leads to better coping and compliance with treatment. Experimenters frequently 
ask individuals who have experienced an aversive event if they have asked themselves 
"Why me?" If they have, it would seem likely that they were attempting to use 
interpretive secondary control. Affleck, Tennen & Gershman (1985) asked 42 mothers 
of high risk infants if they had asked themselves, "Why me?" The majority of parents 
had appraised the crisis as purposeful or gainful which the authors surmise helped 
them maintain self-esteem. Affleck et al. note that: 
This finding supports the hypothesis that the decline of repetitive, intrusive 
thoughts about a stressful experience occurs as victims rebuild basic 
assumptions about themselves and the world: the belief in relative 
invulnerability, the conviction of mastery over the environment, and the view of 
the world as meaningful and understandable (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; 
Perloff, 1983). (p. 655) 
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In a related study, Affleck et al. ( 1985) discovered that of 34 mothers of children 
with insulin dependent diabetes, approximately 85% said they had asked themselves 
the question "Why me?" and most had come up with an answer. Most of those 
answers involved combinations of other secondary control strategies with interpretive 
control. The authors divided the answers as follows: 
1. God's wilVfate (e.g., "God must have a reason for this to happen" [vicarious 
control]; "Things were going so well in our life that this just seems to have been 
destined to happen to us" [illusory control]) 
2. punishment (e.g., "I stopped going to church after I was married" [vicarious 
control]) 
3. selection (e.g., "I guess I was selected to have this happen to my child 
[vicarious control]; I'm the type that can handle something like this"). (p. 371) 
Nearly two-thirds of these mothers said there were benefits to having a child 
with diabetes such as emotional growth, improved family health habits, closer bonds 
within the family and deeper compassion for others. 
In a study of 65 women with impaired fertility, Mendola, Tennen, Affleck, 
McCann & Fitzgerald (1990), found that believing that the struggle to conceive had 
strengthened one's marriage, and attributing the failure to biomedical causes, each 
made an independent contribution to psychological symptoms. The conceptual 
distinctions among primary control, secondary control, and causal attributions would 
seem to be supported with causal attributions reflecting primary and secondary control 
strategies at times. Causal ascriptions brought meaning to misfortune, thereby 
promoting interpretive control. The answers people come up with for "Why me?" help 
them to restore their belief in an orderly, purposeful existence. Mendola et al. (1990) 
state that " ... threat appraisal, secondary control strategies, and causal beliefs each play 
a pivotal role in people's psychological response to threatening events" (p. 91). 
The findings from Affleck et al.'s (1987) study of patients with rheumatoid 
arthritis emphasize the need to distinguish which aspects of chronic illnesses are 
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subject to the patient's control in making predictions about the adaptive significance 
of control appraisals in a chronic disease. The subjects in this study reported they felt 
more in control of their symptoms but their physician had more control over the 
course of their disease (See also Miller, 1980). Living with a serious chronic illness 
involves attempting to balance our need to maintain a sense of mastery over our lives 
with the perceived need to surrender treatment of our disease to health care providers 
(Reid, 1984). In other words, balancing primary and secondary control processes 
encourages both action and acceptance. 
When patients feel that they have lost control of their physical health, and that 
they cannot fully trust their health care providers, they frequently resort to covert 
strategies to regain that control. Montbriand and Laing (1991) state that 
noncompliance with health care directives may be an attempt by patients to regain 
control of their own disorder. The authors also report that in their Canadian subjects, 
89% (67 out of 75) of the informants were using alternative health care. None of the 
subjects had informed their physicians they were using alternative health care. Most of 
the patients chose a physical alternative such as an acupuncturist, chiropractor, or 
vitamin supplements. Those who chose to use spiritual alternative care evoked a 
cosmic source which was usually but not always God or a saint. Psychological 
processes of alternative care included visualization techniques, self-distraction, and 
attitudinal change. Although coveting taking back control, some of the patients 
immediately gave that control away to an alternative practitioner. 
Montbriand and Liang (1991) caution biomedical professionals to question their 
belief that they are responsible for and in control of their patients' health care. Patients 
who seem compliant may actually be covertly working with alternative methods. 
Besides the finding that patients frequently take back control in this way, the authors 
state that all health care appears to be susceptible to the forces of chance. They add 
that believing that anyone can control a health-care action is an instance of illusory 
control used to deny the chance nature of healing. 
Culture and Reli~ion 
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Spiritual faith, in all its many forms, is also frequently associated with both 
vicarious and interpretive secondary control. Thompson and Spacapan (1991) state 
that for many subgroups in Western societies undergoing major life stresses, the 
choice between attempting to change a situation or adjusting to it is a central concern. 
They cite religious involvement of African Americans as an example of secondary 
control processes which are used to lessen stress and impart a sense of mastery and 
self-esteem. Meyerowitz (1980) sampled strongly Catholic working class subjects 
finding that they frequently attributed cancer to God's will, but Taylor et al. (1984) 
found that a predominantly Jewish, upper middle class sample rarely did. 
In a study of adolescent cancer patients, Tebbi, Mallon, Richards, and Bigler, 
(1987) suggest the following: 
... religion provides a valuable source of support for many patients, providing a 
meaningful interpretation of existence and giving life a purpose which it might 
not otherwise have. The belief that religion can provide security in the face of 
death, endorsed by a majority of these patients, is in accord with data from 
previous investigations of advanced cancer patients (Gibbs & Achterberg-
Lawlis, 1978; Yates, Chalmer, St. James, Follansbee & McKegney, 1981) that 
showed less fear of death and greater life satisfaction in more religious patients. 
(p. 694) 
The majority of adolescent patients in this study practiced their religion which 
helped them understand and accept their experience as part of a divine plan and to find 
some measure of security in the face of death. Over two-thirds said that they relied on 
a supreme being to control what they could not. Spilk:a and Bridges (1989) posit that 
prayer as a mechanism of secondary control helps the individual to feel more capable 
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which results in a change in the self. Coming to terms with life as the medium of both 
good and bad experiences by using secondary control strategies "lessens the weight of 
life's tragedies" (p. 349). Gibbs and Achterberg-Lawlis (1978) found that the adult 
terminal cancer patients they studied whose religion was a "powerful sustaining force" 
for them reported less conscious fear of death, less death imagery, less difficulty 
sleeping and a greater willingness to accept social support. 
Gotay (1984) interviewed 112 female cancer patients and their mates. She found 
that patients with the most advanced disease were more likely to share their fears not 
only with other people but with their God. According to Gotay, religion may become 
more important over the course of an illness as death nears. 
The importance of religious faith in other cultures gives us fascinating glimpses 
into the ways control is perceived in other countries. For instance, Dalal & Pande, 
(1988), explain that in Hinduism the principle of KARMA is widely accepted as an 
explanation for many tragic happenings in life: 
In Hindu culture particularly, belief in the principle of KARMA implies that 
good and bad deeds accumulate over all previous lives and if someone is 
suffering, he or she must have done some wrong in the previous lives. As 
interpreted by Parajpe (1984), the principle of KARMA is based on 
determinism, that all human behavior is lawful and no one can escape 
experiences of joy or suffering as the consequences of his own past deeds. This 
principle not only restores one's faith injustice but also provides a very 
convincing and socially acceptable explanation for the event. (p. 27) 
Permanently disabled patients in this study were found less motivated to search 
for the causes of the tragic event and attributed the accident more to external factors 
than those who were temporarily disabled. Chance and God's will were the causes 
most frequently mentioned and attributions to KARMA and God's will were 
significantly correlated with psychological recovery. 
Dalal and Pande explain that belief in the principle of KARMA is all pervasive 
among Hindus. Karma explains all of life's vicissitudes and reinforces the Hindu's 
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faith in a just world. Desire to control the environment is inhibited in Hindus in favor 
of controlling their emotions (Ruback and Pandey, 1991). Other sections of the Indian 
population including the poor (Sinha, Jain & Pandey, 1980), the disadvantaged (Misra 
and Misra, 1986) and the depressed (Jain, 1987) have also been found to frequently 
make attributions to God's will and chance. When the outcome is temporary and 
controllable, Hindus appear to prefer primary control, but when confronted with a 
permanent, unmodifiable outcome, they generally depend on illusory or vicarious 
control (Dalal & Pande, 1988). 
The most exhaustive, although merely exploratory, study of cultural differences 
in the use of primary and secondary control was done by Weisz, Rothbaum & 
Blackburn (1984). These authors contrasted Japanese and American perspectives and 
practices in child rearing, socialization, religion and philosophy, work and 
psychotherapy. The only area Weisz and his colleagues found that Japanese seem to 
emphasize primary control is in those situations which involve pressure to achieve, 
especially academically. Otherwise, secondary control appears to be the primary mode 
of control for the Japanese. 
Weisz and his colleagues looked at Zen Buddhism as a representative religion in 
Japan. In Zen Buddhism the worshiper attempts to purge himself of desire in the 
pursuit of bliss or enlightenment. With enlightenment, Buddhists no longer seek to 
change even tragic realities; instead they reinterpret and reorient to them as in 
interpretive secondary control. Kojima (1984) notes that, for Japanese, there is no 
separation between the self and the environment. It is the relationship between the two 
rather than the control of one over the other which Japanese seek to regulate. 
Of course, all religions emphasize secondary control by providing purpose and 
meaning, and by fostering obedience to, association with and protection by at least 
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one deity. Christians historically have tempered their secondary control with a large 
dose of primary control, however. They send out missionaries, wage wars, evangelize, 
do good deeds and pray that God will alter reality as the supplicant wishes. In 
contrast, Zen Buddhists peacefully accept things as they are, seeing good deeds as 
hindrances to true insight (Noss, 1966). 
Both vicarious and predictive secondary control can be seen in the Japanese 
worker. Where Americans value the self-made man with his emphasis on primary 
control, workers in Japan are more concerned with their company's success (Byron, 
1981). When Japanese workers strive for primary control via a strike, they 
symbolically stop work over a lunch hour or make up the time later so that they 
maintain their vicarious secondary control. The Japanese have the security of 
predictive and vicarious control in their clear status hierarchy, but it comes at the cost 
of personal autonomy (Weisz et al., 1984). 
Psychotherapy is even more different in the two cultures than business practices. 
Most American psychotherapists work with their clients to alter symptoms or 
problems. Japanese practitioners, on the other hand, consider a patient cured "when he 
has stopped groping for means to relieve his symptoms" (Reynolds, 1980, p. 34). 
Reynolds describes one of the main forms of therapy in Japan in the following: 
Naikan "best elucidates the core values of the Japanese culture" (Lebra, 1976, p. 
201). It involves continuous, carefully structured, solitary meditation, initially in 
a small enclosed space, from early morning until late at night. Ideally, these 
meditations provoke an emotionally intense "restructuring of the client's view of 
his past ... along with a reassessment of this self-image and his current social 
relationships." (p 47-48) 
Naikan therapy appears to offer its clients interpretive secondary control by 
providing meaning and purpose regardless of whether the patient's symptoms have 
been eliminated. 
In a reply to Weisz et al., Azuma (1984) describes how he was socialized as a 
Japanese to yield in order to control his assertive drives and protect the peace and 
harmony of the group. He speaks of three different kinds of yielding: mature, self-
controlled yielding; the yielding of being at peace with what fate has given one; and 
yielding based on love and empathy. In another response to Weisz et al., Kojima 
(1984) describes the Japanese art of indirectness: 
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For example, instead of giving advice directly to a person, we Japanese often ask 
a third person to do so on our behalf. This indirect route is taken because we 
believe that it is more effective and can avoid arousing unpleasant feelings that 
often occur between the person giving advice and the one receiving it. Thus, 
primary control is exerted in a manner that is socially acceptable. What may be 
the difference between the Japanese and U.S. cultures is not only the ratio of 
primary to secondary control, but also the nature of socially accepted modes of 
primary control, that is, direct versus indirect. (p. 972) 
Because secondary control processes are so integral to their culture, the Japanese 
are more interested in finer discriminations between those processes. Weisz, 
Rothbaum, and Blackburn (1984) relate the following illustration: "An American first 
visiting a sushi bar may see raw fish on rice, whereas a Japanese may see a rich array 
of delicacies, each differing from the others in subtle but very meaningful ways" (p. 
974). 
In a review of cultural differences in the concept of the self, Landrine (1992) 
proposes that our differences are mostly in the meanings we attach to behavior rather 
than in the behaviors themselves. She explains that in Western culture, since control is 
understood in primary control terms, we are expected to act upon the world and others 
in order to meet our needs, avoid punishment, and further our way of life. When we 
fail to seek primary control we are labeled helpless, passive, unassertive and lacking 
in self-efficacy, submissive, low in self-esteem, inadequate and depressed. 
In contrast, Landrine lists the following sociocentric cultures: Asian-Americans, 
Black-Americans, Native-Americans, Hindu-Americans, most White American 
women, and the vast majority of people around the world. In these cultures, 
individuals are inseparable from their roles within the family, more concerned with 
meeting the needs of their families and communities than their own. 
In several cultures including Indonesian, Polynesian, some Asian, several 
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Southeast Asian and many Native-American, ancestors and other entities are thought 
to dwell within individuals, using them as vessels. The Lohorung of East Nepal (see 
Hardman, 1981), share entity-forces as a community, linking individuals to ancestors. 
When a shared self has been away from any one person for too long, symptoms appear 
in the individual. He is healed when the self is found and returned to him (Landrine, 
1992). 
The Balinese see the individual as "a receptacle within which several 
supernatural forces interact as integral components of the individual's personality" 
(Landrine, 1992, p. 410). The Balinese destroy anything unique to the individual, who 
does not truly exist, in order to assure the immaterial beings, who are more real, are 
presented in as pure a form as possible. Landrine (1992) explains: 
(In sociocentric cultures,) the indexical self engages in secondary control: The 
individual is changed, adjusted and acted on until he or she fits more 
harmoniously within the family, relationship or community; or, the entire group 
is changed to improve the quality of life of all of its members, rather than for 
any individual. This radically different understanding of control can be 
misinterpreted by Western clinicians as submissiveness, passivity and 
helplessness and results in the frequent urge to provide assertiveness training, in 
particular, for Asian-American clients. Increasing the secondary- not the 
primary - control of all members of the relationship of relevance may be a more 
culturally sensitive, appropriate and acceptable treatment goal. (p. 412) 
Landrine cautions Western psychotherapists who may be tempted to diagnose 
persons from other cultures as psychotic because they hear or see other entities, or 
because of other experiences or thoughts which would reflect pathology in our culture, 
that these persons may simply be reflecting their own cultures. She believes therapists 
must be culturally sensitive to avoid interventions which may be harmful to these 
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individuals. In their cultures autonomy cuts the self off from the community, resulting 
in isolation and loneliness (Shweder & Bourne, 1982). Relinquishing primary control 
leads to a sense of purpose, meaning, belonging and security in their families and 
communities. 
Earle (1986) applied the two process model to understanding the functioning of 
entire nations. The prevailing strategy among nations has been to increase their power 
with regard to potential adversaries. As each side develops more advanced 
technologies, which eventually become available to even less stable third parties, the 
peoples of those nations, whose own needs for control have been thwarted, resist the 
actions of the politicians. Vietnam, the oil embargo, and the Iranian hostage crisis of 
the 1970s (cf. Yankelovich, 1982) seriously impaired America's potency, leaving us 
doubtful of our ability to exercise significant primary control in the international 
arena. This had real consequences for domestic political priorities and foreign policy 
actions. The countries of the former Soviet block have more recently had their own 
problems with their ability to exercise primary control. Earle explains that, as a result, 
the politicians began to depend heavily on interpretive control in the form of "rigidly 
ideological beliefs about the nature of the 'other side' and the necessity of continued 
struggle" (p. 372). This allows the politicians to reduce their differences down to a 
struggle of "good" against "evil'', thereby maintaining a sense of order and 
predictability. Earle states that this guarantees that the cycle will repeat itself and that 
foreign policy will continue to be based on illusion and erroneous judgment. When the 
people of a nation lose trust in their leaders, they will struggle to regain control over 
those decisions and experiences which affect them and their loved ones. Nations must, 
at some point, discontinue conceiving of control as a subject-object relationship, in 
which the strongest nations are allowed to exercise primary control over an "object" 
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(e.g., land, resources, subject populations). Instead power could be considered in the 
context of a subject-subject relationship based on knowledge rather than illusion, "a 
dynamic system in which control needs are realized by the exercise of mutual 
influence" (Earle, 1986, p. 374). 
Earle (1986) writes that, "In personal relations, 'success' requires a more subtle 
appreciation of the ability to attain control by giving up control - i. e., by contributing 
to the well-being of the other in ways that will reciprocally enhance both oneself and 
the relationship" (p. 374). 
Earle seems to be advocating that we might have something to learn from the 
other cultures mentioned in this chapter. Control strategies in international relations, 
however, have been firmly rooted in the Western business model which has had, not 
surprisingly, similar problems. Rather than the communal nature of business favored 
by the Japanese, in the United States the worker-management relationship is viewed 
as adversarial (Kanungo, 1992). Individuals within the organization are separate, 
autonomous and independent of one another in a win-lose battle for available 
resources. 
In a paper on the experience of powerlessness in organizations, Ashforth (1989) 
writes that the usual managerial response to employee disruption, apathy or alienation 
is to fortify the system of control. Ashforth contends that it is precisely because of the 
employees' perceptions of lack of control or autonomy that much of this behavior 
occurs. He recommends less control over these individuals instead of more: 
Unfortunately, it is the irony of control systems that they tend to be self-
validating: Compliance justifies the existing controls; noncompliance justifies 
their extension. This circularity, of course, gives rise to a vicious circle of ever-
increasing control and deviance. (p. 235) 
Kanungo (1992) recommends that managers begin to see themselves as a 
"connected self," "part of an enduring relationship with a sense of community" (p. 
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421) rather than isolated individuals interested in their own rights with regard to their 
workers. This is necessary because when people perceive that their opportunities for 
control have been blocked by their organizations, they will generally attempt to 
reestablish that control. They may attempt direct primary control strategies such as 
confronting the source of the problem or indirect primary control by decreasing 
productivity (Greenberger and Strasser, 1986). If these methods fail, they may also 
attempt to reduce ambiguity by exercising predictive secondary control. Greenberger 
and Strasser (1986) note the following: 
Secondary or indirect strategies (even when perceived nonveridically) are 
particularly important in the organizational setting since control seekers so 
frequently perceive themselves as unable to control outcomes directly. For 
example, the denial of requests (increase in compensation, additional staff) is 
most common in organizations. Short of helplessness, employees are forced to 
rely on these secondary approaches to achieve some semblance of control 
homeostasis. (p. 172-173) 
It should be clear from this chapter that individuals who want control will find a 
way to get it. Patients make use of various types of secondary control even when they 
must do so covertly. The emphasis on primary control found in Western cultures is 
very different from other cultures which value and utilize secondary control to a much 
greater extent. The next chapter will include areas for future research on the two 
process model as well as applications for the concept. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has been an attempt to bring together what is known at this time 
about Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder's (1982) two-process theory of primary and 
secondary control. It should be apparent now that this is a concept worthy of 
continued and vigorous study. Nevertheless, the discovery of the importance of this 
concept should in no way discredit other control theories which have added 
immensely to our understanding of how people behaviorally and cognitively respond 
to their world. Chapter Two demonstrates that, lacking an overarching theory of 
control processes, it appears that the two process model is often necessary to explain 
inconsistencies in studies of other theories. In response to an article by Weisz (1990) 
on the two process model, Rosenberg (1990) states the following: 
One of the most impressive features of Weisz' research on the beliefs, goals 
and styles of control is that it successfully integrates a broad range of 
concepts - locus of control, self-efficacy, learned helplessness, mastery, 
powerlessness, and so on - that have often been treated separately in the 
literature. (p. 147) 
Many would say that this concept is not well enough defined, that its research 
has not been done with enough precision. This problem will not be easily overcome. 
Macnamara, Govitrikar and Doan (1988) submit that it may be unworkable to 
distinguish any causal laws in psychology that entail reference to a person's beliefs 
and desires. It may be a very long time before our ability is sufficient to design 
experiments to determine the composition of what Quine and Ullian (1978) call our 
"web of belief." These authors suggest that our beliefs are all connected, interwoven 
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strands will not reveal the intricate beauty or complexity of the structure, and altering 
one or two strands without a knowledge of what may be maintaining them will not 
substantially alter the web. Mark Twain, a common-sense psychologist, describes the 
difficulty of knowing another's mind in the following: 
What a wee little part of a person's life are his acts and his words! His real 
life is led in his head, and is known to none but himself. All day long, the 
mill of his brain is grinding, and his thoughts, not those other things, are his 
history. These are his life, and they are not written, and cannot be written. 
Every day would make a whole book of 80,000 words - 365 books a year. 
Biographies are but the clothes and buttons of the man - the biography of 
the man himself cannot be written. 
Given the difficulty of ultimately fully understanding and being able to predict 
when and how persons can and should attempt primary or secondary control (which 
may be our need as researchers for interpretive and predictive control), how might we 
go about the seemingly impossible? Thompson and Spacapan (1991) provide 
something of a roadmap: 
Guiding questions for any project should include the following: What aspect 
of control - contingency or competence - is most relevant to the area under 
study? Are measures of both global and specific aspects of control included, 
and of primary and secondary control? How do the various dimensions of 
control interact to affect outcomes? (p. 11) 
It should not be surprising that Weisz (personal communication) has stated that 
there are many more secondary control strategies that have not been labeled as such. 
For example, Thompson (1985), in studying, immediately and after one year, people 
whose homes were damaged in a fire, found five ways of focusing on the positive in 
the face of an uncontrollable aversive event: finding side benefits, making social 
comparisons, imagining worse situations, forgetting the negative, and redefining. She 
found these cognitions to be fairly stable after a year. Those victims who did not use 
the above secondary control strategies were devastated by the fire and remained so for 
the year following. Those who did use them reported fewer symptoms and better 
coping. Individuals who focused on the positive tended to use all five categories, 
further illustrating the complexity of the web of belief metaphor. 
Adaptive and Maladaptive Uses of the Model 
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Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982) define adaptiveness in terms of the relative 
levels of primary and secondary control, with the ideal balance or sequence of primary 
and secondary control varying from situation to situation. Much more work could be 
done to study the two process model in different situations and balances. More work 
like Thompson's needs to be done to determine whether secondary control beliefs 
change over time in field settings where the events have real consequence for people's 
lives. Interviews appear to be the best way to get at people's goals and intents for their 
control choices, but Schulman, Castellon, and Seligman's (1989) Content Analysis of 
Verbatim Explanations (CA VE) technique also shows substantial promise. 
Peterson & Bossio (1991) describe unpublished studies done with J. Bryce, N. 
Kirsch & K. Lachman. In the first study, using CAVEing, they examined the first-
person narratives of former American slaves who told their stories to interviewers 
during the 1930s (Yetman, 1970). The experimenters found that the subjects who had 
survived through slavery, with its loss of personal control, into old age, relied to a 
great extent on secondary control processes. The second study CA VEed the written 
interviews of a group of mothers struggling to raise their families in the stresses of 
contemporary war-tom Beirut (Bryce, 1986). Both the slaves and the mothers in 
Beirut used more secondary control strategies than two samples of contemporary 
Americans. 
Besides control over negative events, Bryant (1989) advocates studying 
judgments of primary and secondary control in relation to positive events. He crossed 
primary-secondary control with positive-negative experience and developed a four-
factor model of perceived control consisting of self-evaluations of one's ability to: 
(a) avoid negative events (primary-negative control) through primary 
control; (b) cope with negative events (secondary-negative control); (c) 
obtain positive events (primary-positive control); and (d) savor positive 
events (secondary-positive control). (p. 775) 
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This four-factor model distinguished between perceived primary control (over 
events) and perceived secondary control (over feelings) separately in relation to 
positive and negative experiences. Bryant states that his model explains people's self-
evaluations of control better than other conceptual models, and was fairly accurate in 
predicting levels of subjective well-being and distress. 
Chapter Four indicates that health care appears to be the most fruitful area for 
application and future research at this time. Given the large numbers of patients who 
covertly utilize alternative health care (Montbriand & Laing, 1991), it is clear that we 
are not as trusting of the physician's ability to heal us as we once were. Doan and 
Gray (1992) call the cancer patient who adopts a proactive stance toward his illness 
(e.g., using imagery as in the Simontons' (1978) Getting Well Again, or expressive, 
intuitive techniques from Bernie Siegel's (1986) Love, Medicine and Miracles or 
(1989) Peace, Love and Healing) the Heroic Cancer Patient. These patients appear to 
feel better and be better adjusted (Derogatis, 1986, Seeman & Seeman, 1983, Taylor, 
1983), although there is only equivocal evidence that these techniques can prevent or 
halt cancer (see Cunningham, 1985; Fox, 1983; Spiegel, Bloom & Kraemer, 1989). 
Doan and Gray voice concern that some patients who adopt the heroic stance are even 
more shattered than they would have been if their illness recurs or if they are not able 
to halt its progress. These authors posit that illusion may be preferable when the future 
is uncertain, as in cancers with unpredictable courses. At these times, the heroic stance 
towards cancer could provide many patients with "security, a sense of personal 
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control, and a way of enduring hardships associated with the illness and its treatment" 
(p. 263). 
Taylor et al. (1991) contend that trusting physicians to heal us may be adaptive 
as long as symptoms are not severe. With more serious conditions, belief in vicarious 
control becomes less adaptive. Trillin (1981), a cancer patient herself, has this to say: 
So, once we have recognized the limitations of the magic of doctors and 
medicine, where are we? We have to tum to our own magic, to our ability to 
"control" our bodies. For people who don't have cancer, this often takes the 
form of jogging and exotic diets and transcendental meditation. For people 
who have cancer, it takes the form of conscious development of the will to 
live. (p. 700) 
Taylor et al. (1991) submit that it is important for professionals to support the 
patient's perception of control and autonomy while at the same time encouraging her 
to prepare for all eventualities. These authors state that: 
It will be important for future research to explore the boundaries of both 
personal and vicarious control, and for future work to illuminate more fully 
the circumstances under which each form of control may contribute to or 
detract from psychological adjustment. (p.107) 
It is difficult to conceive of areas where an understanding of the two process 
model would not be helpful. At the Chicago Blues Festival one year a blind musician 
listening to another performer shouted with joy, "I knew that was going to happen! I 
knew that was going to happen!" To him, being able to predict the notes was his 
measure of mastery. From there, it is a short distance to literary criticism, management 
training, race relations, and even sports. Reser & Scherl (1988) discuss flow 
experiences, which happen at times during physical competitions or wilderness 
outings, as being typified by an awareness of being "a distinct yet integral part of the 
ongoing transaction, and a sense of oneness with what one is doing" (p. 272). This 
language sounds very much like descriptions of the Japanese culture in the previous 
chapter. The authors continue with the following: 
The quality of feedback and consequent sense of oneness-with-activity 
found in flow situations allows for self-control options relating to emotional 
response (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984), and predictive and interpretive 
control (Rothbaum et al., 1982). 
Mental Health Applications 
In mental health, the two process model gives practitioners a tool to use with 
many different populations. White & Janson (1986) suggest that interventions with 
those who are institutionalized in highly constraining environments, such as those 
mentioned in Chapter Three, not focus on ways of enhancing primary control, which 
is seriously limited, but secondary control, which would be more realistic in the 
situation. Rothbaum et al. (1982) suggest that it might be useful to match therapeutic 
methods to clients along the primary and secondary control dimensions. 
Taylor and Brown (1988) challenge the traditional notion that therapy involves 
helping the client view himself and his circumstances more realistically. Positive 
illusions of control are both functional and adaptive according to them, especially in 
aversive circumstances. Doan and Gray (1992) prefer working toward an optimal 
balance of illusion and reality, but admit that knowing where that balance is from 
moment to moment will be challenging. 
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Considering that people will go to extreme lengths to retain some semblance of 
control over their lives, it behooves therapists to understand all they can about those 
processes. Rezek & Leary (1991) note that "individuals with anorexic tendencies react 
to low perceived control by restricting food intake as a means of regaining a sense of 
control" (p. 129), because eating is one of the few things in their lives that others 
cannot control (Bruch, 1978). The self-restricted eating is a form of "displaced 
reactance" which substitutes for a lack of control in other areas of the individual's life. 
The authors propose that anorexia may be a kind of secondary control. Other mental 
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health concerns which have been studied embracing the two process model as a factor 
include schizophrenia in Switzerland (Dauwalder, 1988), nightmares (Cook, Caplan & 
Wolowitz, 1990), dread rumors (Walker & Blaine, 1991) and bereavement (Wortman 
and Silver, 1989). 
Much more could be learned about how other cultures view primary and 
secondary control. We may find that we are the culture which values secondary 
control strategies the least! A good beginning is being made by Trommsdorff (1991) 
who studied German mothers to determine if those who were more empathetic with 
their children would have children with higher empathy. She states that: 
Especially the mother's effort to experience vicariously the child's needs -
an essential aspect of secondary (in contrast to primary) control orientation 
seems to be an important factor in the development of empathy. Therefore, 
we are presently studying the effects of growing up with a belief system of 
primary vs. secondary control orientation in different cultures. (p. 390) 
In studying instruction in universities, Perry & Penner (1990) found that 
expressive instructors elicit selective attention. They also advocate well-organized 
lectures in which predictive secondary control would presumably be easier to attempt. 
Future Research 
More work on understanding the development of primary and secondary control 
processes through the life span and gender differences in the use of the model would 
seem to be warranted. Individual as well as group differences in primary and 
secondary control use will surely produce interesting data. For instance, Heath (1986) 
noted that her sample of incarcerated criminals showed a preference for and belief in 
their ability to exercise primary control despite their confinement. Further research 
should distinguish between control by powerful others who are concerned with one's 
welfare as compared to those who are not, such as prison guards or political dictators. 
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To summarize, much more research needs to be done on primary and secondary 
control in several areas. There are several more secondary control strategies to name 
and define. It seems clear that individuals use both primary and secondary control 
strategies in a myriad of adaptive and maladaptive ways, many of which have been 
discussed above. The use of primary and secondary control strategies do change with 
development, across cultures, and to a much lesser extent by gender. Research on this 
rich concept, as on any belief, will be difficult and less precise than we might like; 
however there appears to be little doubt that the two process model is an important 
concept which deserves a central role in any study of control theory. 
REFERENCES 
Abramson, L. Y., & Sackeim, H. A. (1977). A paradox in depression: 
Uncontrollability and self-blame. Psychological Bulletin, 84 (5), 838-851. 
Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness 
in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 
49-74. 
Affleck, G., Allen, D. A., Tennen, H., McGrade, B. J., & Ratzan, S. (1985). Causal 
and control cognitions in parents' coping with chronically ill chldren. Journal of 
Social and Clinical Psychology, 3 (3), 367-377. 
Affleck, G., Pfeiffer, C., Tennen, H., & Fifield, J. (1988). Social support and 
psychosocial adjustment to rheumatoid arthritis: Quantitative and qualitative 
findings. Arthritis Care and Research, 1, 71-77. 
Affleck, G., Tennen, H., Croog, S., & Levine, S. (1987). Causal attribution, perceived 
benefits, and morbidity following a heart attack: An eight-year study. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55, 29-35. 
Affleck, G., Tennen, H., & Gershman, K. (1985). Cognitive adaptations to high-risk 
infants: The search for mastery, meaning, and protection from future harm. 
American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 89, 653-656. 
Affleck, G., Tennen, H., Pfeiffer, C., & Fifield, J. (1987). Appraisals of control and 
predictability in adapting to a chronic disease. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 53 (2), 273-279. 
Affleck, G., Tennen, H., Pfeiffer, C., & Fifield, J. (1988). Social comparisons in 
70 
71 
rheumatoid arthritis: Accuracy and adaptational significance. Journal of Social 
and Clinical Psychology, 6, 219-234. 
Affleck, G., Tennen, H., & Rowe, J. (1991). Infants in crisis: How parents cope with 
newborn intensive care and its aftermath. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Aldrich, L., & Mendkoff, E. (1963). Relocation of the aged and disabled: A mortality 
study. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 11, 185-194. 
Aldwin, C., & Revenson, T. (1987). Does coping help? A reexamination of the 
relation between coping and mental health. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 53, 337-348. 
Alloy, L.B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1979). Judgment of contingency in depressed and 
nondepressed college students: Sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 108, 441-485. 
Alloy, L.B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1982). Learned helplessness, depression and the 
illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42 (6), 1114-
1126. 
Alloy, L.B., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1978). On the cognitive component of learned 
helplessness and depression. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning 
and motivation (Vol. 13). New York: Academic Press. 
Antonovsky, A. (1979). Health, stress and coping. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Ashforth, B. E. (1989). The experience of powerlessness in organizations. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 43, 207-242. 
Azuma, Hiroshi. (1984). Secondary control as a heterogenous category. American 
Psychologist, 39, 970-971. 
Band, E. B., & Weisz, J. R. (1988). How to feel better when it feels bad: Children's 
perspectives on coping with everyday stress. Developmental Psychology, 24, 
247-253. 
Band, E. B. & Weisz, J. R. (1990). Developmental differences in primary and 
secondary control coping and adjustment to juvenile diabetes. Journal of 
Clinical Child Psychology, 19 (2), 150-158. 
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. 
Psychological Review, 84, 191-215. 
72 
Bandura, A. (1981). Self-referent thought: A developmental analysis of self-efficacy. 
In J. H. Flavell & L. Ross (Eds.), Social cognitive development: Frontiers and 
possible futures (pp. 200-239). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bandura, A., O'Leary, A., Taylor, C. B., Gauthier, J., & Gossard, D. (1987). 
Perceived self-efficacy and pain control: Opioid and nonopioid mechanism. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 563-571. 
Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression. New York: Hoeber. 
Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York: Free Press .. 
Bengston, V. L. (1963). Self-determination: A social and psychological perspective on 
helping the aged. Geriatrics, 28, 118. 
Berglas, S., & Jones, E. E. (1978). Drug choice as a self-handicapping strategy in 
response to noncontingent success. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 52, 525-535. 
Blackbum, T. C. (1984). The type A coronary-prone behavior pattern, hostility, and 
the primary-secondary model of perceived control: Differential control 
preferences. Dissertation Abstracts International, 46, 2108. (University 
Microfilms No. 85-08, 565.) 
Brandtstadler, J., Krampen, G., & Greve, W. (1987). Personal control over 
development: Effects on the perception and emotional evaluation of personal 
73 
development in adulthood. International Journal of Behavioral Development, JO 
(1), 99-120. 
Brim, 0. G. (1974, September). The sense of control over one's life. Invited address to 
Divisions 7 and 8, presented at the 82nd Annual Convention of the American 
Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA. 
Brim, 0. G. (1980). How a person controls the sense of efficacy through the life span. 
Paper presented at the Social Science Research Council Conference on the Self 
and Perceived Personal Control Through the Life Span. New York. 
Brotman-Band, E. (1989). Coping and cognition among juvenile diabetics. 
Dissertation Abstracts International 51, 419. 
Brotman-Band, E., & Weisz, J. (1988). How to feel better when it feels bad: 
Children's perspectives on coping with everyday stress. Developmental 
Psychology, 24 (2), 247-253. 
Bruch, H. (1978). The golden cage: The enigma of anorexia nervosa. New York: 
Vintage. 
Brunson, B. I., & Matthews, K. A. (1981). The Type A coronary-prone behavior 
pattern and reactions to uncontrollable stress: An analysis of performance 
strategies, affect, and attributions during failure. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 40, 906-918. 
Bryant, F. B. (1989). A four-factor model of perceived control: Avoiding, coping, 
obtaining and savoring. Journal of Personality, 57 (4), 773 - 797. 
Bryce, J. W. (1986). Cries of children in Lebanon as voiced by their mothers. Beirut: 
Express International. 
Burger, J.M. (1984). Desire for control, locus of control, and proneness to depression. 
Journal of Personality, 52 (1), 71-89. 
Burger, J.M. (1986). Desire for control and the illusion of control. The effects of 
familiarity and sequence of outcomes. Journal of Research in Personality, 20, 
66-76. 
Burger, J.M., & Arkin, R. M. (1980). Prediction, control, and learned helplessness. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38 (3), 482-491. 
Burger, J.M., & Cooper, H. M. (1979). The desirability of control. Motivation and 
Emotion, 3, 381-393. 
74 
Butler, R. N. (1975). Why survive: Being old in America. New York: Harper and Row. 
Byron, C. (1981, March 30). How Japan does it. Time, pp. 54-60. 
Cameron, A. M. (1984). Understanding children's academic and behavior problems: 
A comparison of the one- and two-process models of perceived control. Doctoral 
dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 1984). Dissertation 
Abstracts International, 45, 3064. 
Chanowitz, B., & Langer, E. (1980). Knowing more (or less) than you can show: 
Understanding control through the mindlessness-mindfullness distinction. In J. 
Garber & M. E. P. Seligman (Eds.), Human helplessness (pp. 97-129). New 
York: Academic Press. 
Cherulink, P. D., & Citrin, M. M. (1974). Individual difference in psychological 
reactance: The interaction between locus of control and mode of elimination of 
freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29 (3), 398-404. 
Clark, W. H. (1958). The psychology of religion. New York: Macmillan. 
Cohen, F., & Lazarus, R. (1979). Coping with the stresses of illness. In G. C. Stone, F. 
Cohen, & N. E. Adler (Eds.), Health psychology. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass. 
Compas, B. E., Banez, G. A., Malcarne, V, & Worsham, N. (1991). Perceived control 
and coping with stress: A developmental perspective. Journal of Social Issues, 
47 (4), 23-24. 
Cook, C. A. L., Caplan, R. D., & Wolowitz, H. (1990). Nonwaking responses to 
waking stressors: Dreams and nightmares. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 20 (3), 199-226. 
75 
Coyne, J.C., Aldwin, C., & Lazarus, R. S. (1981). Depression and coping in stressful 
episodes. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 90 (5), 439-447. 
Cunningham, A. J. (1985). The influence of mind on cancer. Canadian Psychology, 
26, 13-29. 
Dalal, A. K., & Pande, N. (1988). Psychological recovery of accident victims with 
temporary and permanent disability. International Journal of Psychology, 23, 
25-40. 
Dauwalder, J. P. (1988). A comprehensive view on affect and logic. Psychopathology, 
21, 95-110. 
DeCharms, R. (1968). Personal causation: The internal affective determinants of 
behavior. New York: Academic Press. 
Derogatis, L. R. (1986). Psychology in cancer medicine: A perspective and overview. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 54, 632-638. 
DesPeres, T. (1976). The survivor. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Doan, B. D., & Gray, R. E. (1992). The heroic cancer patient: A critical analysis of the 
relationship between illusion and mental health. Canadian Journal of 
Behavioural Science, 24 (2), 253-266. 
Dracup, K., Guzy, P. M., Taylor, S. E., & Barry, J. (1986). Cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR) training: Consequences for family members of high-risk 
cardiac patients. Archives of Internal Medicine, 146, 1757-1761. 
76 
DuCette, J., & Wolk, S. (1973). Cognitive and motivational correlates of generalized 
expectancies for control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 26, 420-
426. 
Dweck, C. S., & Repucci, N. D. (1973). Learned helplessness and reinforcement 
responsibility in children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 25, 
109-116. 
Earle, W. B. (1986). International relations and the psychology of control: Alternative 
control strategies and their consequences. Political Psychology, 7 (2), 369-375. 
Erikson, E. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: Norton. 
Erikson, E. H.(1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: Norton. 
Felton, B., & Kahana, E. (1974). Adjustment and situationally-bound locus of control 
among institutionalized aged. Journal of Gerontology, 29 (3), 295-301. 
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Folkman, S. (1984). Personal control and stress and coping processes: A theoretical 
analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46 (4), 839-852. 
Fox, B. H. (1983). Current theory of psychogenic effects on cancer incidence and 
prognosis. Journal of Psychosocial Oncology, 1, 17-31. 
Frankel, A., & Snyder, M. L. (1978). Poor performance following unsolvable 
problems: learned helplessness or egotism? Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 36 (12), 1415-1423. 
Frankl, V. (1963). Man's search/or meaning. New York: Washington Square Press. 
Freedman, D. G. (1975). The development of social hierarchies. In L. Levi (Ed.), 
Society, stress, and disease (Vol. 2): Childhood and adolescence. London: 
Oxford University Press. 
Friedman, M., & Ulmer, D. (1984). Treating type A behavior and your heart. New 
York: Knopf. 
77 
Gaeddert, W. P. (1987). The relationship of gender, gender-related traits, and 
achievement orientation to achievement attributions: A study of subject-selected 
accomplishments. Journal of Personality, 55 (4), 687-710. 
Ganong, L. H., & Coleman, M. (1987). Sex roles and yielded/expressed self-control. 
Sex Roles, 16 (7/8), 401-408. 
Gibbs, H. W., & Achterberg-Lawlis, J. (1978). Spiritual values and death anxiety: 
Implications for counseling with terminal cancer patients. Journal of Counseling 
Psychology, 25, 563-569. 
Glass, D. C. (1977). Behavior patterns, stress, and coronary disease. New York: 
Wiley. 
Golin, S., Terrell, F., & Johnson, B. (1977). Depression and the illusion of control. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 86, 440-442. 
Golin, S., Terrell, F., Weitz, J., & Drost, P. L. (1979). The illusion of control among 
depressed patients. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88, 454-457. 
Gotay, C. C. (1984). The experience of cancer during early and advanced stages: The 
views of patients and their mates. Social Science and Medicine, 18 (7), 605-613. 
Greenberger, D. B., & Strasser, S. (1986). Development and application of a model of 
personal control in organizations. Academy of Management Review, 11, 164-
177. 
Greenberger, D. B., & Strasser, S. (1991). The role of situational and dispositional 
factors in the enhancement of personal control in organizations. Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 13, ·111-145. 
Greenberger, D. B., Strasser, S., Cummings, L. L., & Dunham, R. B. (1989). The 
impact of personal control on performance and satisfaction. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 43, 29-51. 
78 
Grevert, P., & Goldstein, A. (1985). Placebo analgesia, Naloxone, and the role of 
endogenous opioids. In L. White, B. Tursky, & G. E. Schwartz (Eds.), Placebo 
theory, research and mechanisms. New York: Guilford Press. 
Gunnar, M. (1982). Development of control during infancy. Unpublished manuscript, 
University of Minnesota. 
Gurin, P., Gurin, G., Lao, R. C., & Beattie, M. (1969). Internal-external control in the 
motivational dynamics of Negro Youth. Journal of Social Issues, 25 (3), 29-53. 
Hanusa, B. H., & Schulz, R. (1977). Attributional mediators of learned helplessness. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 602-611. 
Hardman, C. (1981). The psychology of conformity and self expression among the 
Lohorung Rai of East Nepal. In P. Heelas & A. Locke (Eds.), Indigenous 
psychologies: The anthropology of the self New York: Academic Press. 
Hartmann, H. (1958). Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation. New York: 
International Press. 
Heath, L. (1986). Comments on Weisz: "Understanding the developing understanding 
of control". In M. Perlmutter (Ed.), Cognitive perspectives on children's social 
and behavioral development: The Minnesota symposia on child psychology 18, 
279-285. 
Heckhausen, J., & Schulz, R. (1990). Life course development and control. 
Unpublished manuscript, Max-Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin. 
Helgeson, V. S. (1992). Moderators of the relation between perceived control and 
adjustment to chronic illness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63 
(4), 656-666. 
79 
Hiroto, D. (1974). Locus of control and learned helplessness. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 102, 187-193. 
Irion, J.C. (1988). A test of two models of controllability in institutionalized older 
adults. Dissertation Abstracts International, 49, 5520. (University Microfilms 
No. 89-04-542) 
Jain, U. C., (1987). Attribution-behavior relationship in the context of learned 
helplessness. In: A. K. Dalal (Ed.), Attribution theory and research in India. 
New Delhi: Eastern Wiley. 
Janoff-Bulman, R., & Frieze, I. H. (1983). A theoretical perspective for understanding 
reactions to victimization. Journal of Social Issues, 39, 1-17. 
Jones, E. E., & Berglas, S. (1978). Control of attributions about the self through self-
handicapping strategies: The appeal of alcohol and the role of 
underachievement. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4 (2), 200-206. 
Kahle, L. R. (1980). Stimulus condition self-selection by males in the interaction of 
locus of control and skill-chance situations. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 38, 50-56. 
Kanungo, R. N. (1992). Alienation and empowerment: Some ethical imperatives in 
business. Journal of Business Ethics, 11, 413-422. 
Kenney, M. R. (1987). Control as a multidimensional construct underlying type A 
behavior. (Doctoral dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology, 
1987). Dissertation Abstracts International. 48. 12B. 
Killiam, E. (1970). Effects of geriatric transfers on mortality rates. Social Work, 15, 
19-26. 
Koenig, H. G., George, L. K., & Siegler, I. C. (1988). The use of religion and other 
emotion-regulating coping strategies among older adults. The Gerontologist, 28, 
303-310. 
Kojima, Hideo. (1984). A significant stride toward the comparative study of control. 
American Psychologist, 39, 972-973. 
Kuypers, J. A., & Bengston, V. L. (1973). Social breakdown and competence: A 
model of normal aging. Human Development, 16, 181-201. 
Landrine, H. (1992). Clinical implications of cultural differences: The referential 
versus the indexical self. Clinical Psychology Review, 12, 401-415. 
Langer, E. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 32, 311-328. 
Langer, E. J. (1977). The psychology of chance. Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 7, 185-207. 
Langer, E. J. (1981). Playing the middle against both ends: The usefulness of adult 
cognitive activity as a model for cognitive activity in childhood and old age. In 
S. R. Yussen (Ed.), The growth of insight in children. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Langer, E.G. (1982). Old age: An artifact? Jn Biology, behavior, and aging. New 
York: National Research Council. 
Langer, E. J. (1983). The Psychology of Control. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Langer, E. F. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
80 
Langer, E. J., & Rodin, J. (1976). The effects of choice and enhanced personal 
responsibility for the aged: A field experiment in an institutional setting. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 191-198. 
Langer, E. J., & Roth, J. (1975). Heads I win, tails it's chance: The effects of sequence 
of outcome on the illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 32, 951-955. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1966). Psychological stress and the coping process. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Lazarus, R. S., and Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, appraisal, and coping. New York: 
Springer. 
Lebra, T. S. (1976). Japanese patterns of behavior. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press. 
Lefcourt, H. M. (1976). Locus of control: Current trends in theory and research. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
81 
Lewinsohn, P. M., Mischel, W., Chaplin, W., & Barton, R. (1980). Social competence 
and depression: The role of illusory self-perceptions. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 89 (2), 203-212. 
Macnamara, J., Govitrikar, V., & Doan, B. (1988). Actions, laws, and scientific 
psychology. Cognition, 29, 1-27. 
Mendola, R. (1990). Coping with chronic pain: Perceptions of control and 
dispositional optimism as moderators of psychological distress. (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1990). Dissertation Abstracts 
International, 51, 5582. 
Mendola, R., Tennen, H., Affleck, G., McCann, L., & Fitzgerald, T. (1990). Appraisal 
and adaptation among women with impaired fertility. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 14, 79-93. 
Meyerowitz, B. E. (1980). Psychosocial correlates of breast cancer and its treatments. 
Psychological Bulletin, 87, 108-131. 
Miller, S. M. (1979). Controllability and human stress: Method, evidence, and theory. 
Behavior Research and Therapy, 17, 287-304. 
Miller, S. (1980). Why having control reduces stress: If I can stop the roller coaster, I 
82 
don't want to get off. In J. Garber & M. Seligman (Eds.), Human helplessness: 
Theory and applications (pp. 71-95). New York: Academic Press. 
Miller, S. M., Brody, D., & Summerton, J. (1988). Styles of coping with threat: 
Implications for health. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 142-
148. 
Miller, S., Leinbach, A., & Brody, D. (1989). Coping style in hypertensive patients: 
Nature and consequences. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 57(3), 
333-337. 
Mills, R. T., & Krantz, D.S. (1979). Information, choice, and reactions to stress: A 
field experiment in a blood bank with laboratory analogue. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 608-620. 
Misra, G., and S. Misra, (1986). Effect of socio-economic background on pupils' 
attribution. Indian Journal of Current Psychological Research, 1, 77-88. 
Montbriand, M. J., & Laing, G. P. (1991). Alternative health care as a control strategy. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 16, 325-332. 
Neiswender, H. E. (1991). An empirical examination of the two-process model of 
perceived control. Dissertation Abstracts International, 52, 5544. (University 
Microfilms No. 92-07, 974) 
Nicholls, J. G. (1978). The development of the concepts of effort and ability, 
perception of academic attainment, and the understanding that difficult tasks 
require more ability. Child Development, 49, 800-814. 
Niebuhr, R. (1943). The Serenity Prayer. Bulletin of the Federal Council of Churches. 
Noss, J.B. (1966). Man's religions (3rd ed.). New York: MacMillan. 
Ogden, S. M. (1963). The reality of God and other essays. New York: Harper and 
Row. 
Parajpe, A. C. (1984). Theoretical psychology: The meeting of East and West. New 
York: Plenum Press. 
Perloff, L. (1983). Perceptions of vulnerability to victimization. Journal of Social 
Issues, 39, 41-61. 
83 
Perry, R. P. & Penner, K. S. (1990). Enhancing academic achievement in college 
students through attributional retraining and instruction. Journal of Educational 
Psychology. 82 (2), 262-271. 
Peterson, C., & Bossio, L. M. (1991). Health and Optimism. New York: Free Press. 
Peterson, C. & Seligman, M. E. P. (1983). Learned helplessness and victimization. 
Journal of Social Issues. 2, 103-116. 
Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1984). Causal explanations as a risk factor for 
depression: Theory and evidence. Psychological Review, 91 (3), 347-374. 
Phares, E. J. (1976). Locus of control in personality. Morristown, NJ: General 
Learning. 
Phillips, B. N. (1963). Age changes in accuracy of self-perceptions. Child 
Development, 34, 1041-1046. 
Piaget, J. (1951). Judgment and reasoning in the child. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Piaget, J. (1983). Piaget's theory. In P.H. Mussen (Ed.), Handbook of child 
psychology (pp. 106-109). New York: Wiley. 
Piper, A. I., & Langer, E. J. (1986). Aging and mindful control. In M. M. Baltes & P. 
B. Baltes (Eds.) The Psychology of Control andAging (pp. 71-89). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Powell, L. H. (1992), The cognitive underpinnings of coronary-prone behaviors. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 16 (2), 123-142. 
84 
Price, V. A. (1982). Type A behavior pattern: A mode/for research and practice. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Quine, W. V., & Ullian, J. S. (1978). The web of belief (2nd ed.). New York: Random 
House. 
Reed, G. M. (1989). Stress, coping, and psychological adaptation in a sample of gay 
and bisexual men with AIDS. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of 
California, Los Angeles. 
Reid, D. (1984). Participatory control and the chronic-illness adjustment process. In 
H. Lefcourt (Ed.), Research with the locus of control construct: Extensions and 
limitations (Vol. 3, pp. 361-389). New York: Academic Press. 
Reser, J.P., & Scherl, L. M. (1988). Clear and unambiguous feedback: A transactional 
and motivational analysis of environmental challenge and self-encounter. 
Journal of Environmental Psychology. 8, 269-286. 
Reynolds, D. K. (1980). The quiet therapies: Japanese pathways to personal growth. 
Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press. 
Rezek, P. J., & Leary, M. R. (1991). Perceived control, drive for thinness, and food 
consumption: Anorexic tendencies as displaced reactance. Journal of 
Personality. 59 (1), 129-142. 
Rodin, J. (1990). Control by any other name: Definitions, concepts, and processes. In 
J. Rodin, C. Schooler, & K. W. Schaie (Eds.) Self-directedness: Cause and 
effects throughout the life course (pp. 1-17). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Rodin, J., Rennert, K., & Solomon, S. K. (1980). Intrinsic motivation for control: Fact 
or fiction. In A. Baum & J.E. Singer, (Eds.), Advances in environmental 
psychology: Vol. 2. Applications of personal control (pp. 131-147). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Rosenberg, M. (1990). Control of environment and control of self. In J. Rodin, C. 
Schooler, & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Self-directedness: Cause and effects 
throughout the life course (pp. 147-154). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
85 
Rosen, H. (1985). Piagetian dimensions of clinical relevance. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Rothbaum, F., & Weisz, J. R. (1989). Child psychopathology and the questfor 
control. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Rothbaum, F., Weisz, J. R., & Snyder, S. S. (1982). Changing the world and changing 
the self: A two-process model of perceived control. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 42, 5-37. 
Ruback, R. B. & Pandey, J. (1991). Crowding, perceived control, and relative power: 
An analysis of households in India, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 21 
(4), 315-344. 
Scheppele, K. L., & Bart, P. B. (1983). Through women's eyes: Defining danger in 
the wake of sexual assault. Journal of Social Issues, 39 (2), 63-81. 
Schmitz, S. A. (1987). Explanatory style and depression: An investigation of the 
relationships between locus of control, causal attribution, and depressive 
symptoms. Dissertation Abstracts International, 48, 3121. (University 
Microfilms No. 87-28, 476) 
Schulman, P., Castellon, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1989). Assessing explanatory 
style: The content analysis of verbatim explanations and the attributional style 
questionnaire. Behavioral Research and Therapy, 27 (5), 505-512. 
Schulz, R. (1976). The effects of control and predictability on the physical and 
psychological well-being of the institutionalized aged. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 33, 563-573. 
Schulz, R. (1980). Aging and control. In J. Garber & M. P. Seligman (Eds.), Human 
helplessness: Theory and applications, (pp. 261-277). New York: Academic 
Press. 
86 
Schulz, R. (1986). Successful aging: Balancing primary and secondary control. Adult 
Development and Aging News, 13 (3), 2-4. 
Schulz, R., & Brenner, G. (1977). Relocation of the aged: A review and theoretical 
analysis. Journal of Gerontology, 32, 323-333. 
Schulz, R., & Hanusa, B. H. (1978). Long-term effects of predictability and control 
enhancing interventions: Findings and ethical issues. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 36, 1194-1201. 
Schulz, R., Heckhausen, J., & Locher, J. L. (1991). Adult development, control and 
adaptive functioning, Journal of Social Issues, 47 (4) 177-196. 
Seeman, M., & Seeman, T. E. (1983). Health behavior and personal autonomy: A 
longitudinal study of the sense of control in illness. Journal of Health and Social 
Behavior, 24, 144-160. 
Seligman, M. E. P. (1973). Fall into helplessness. Psychology Today, 7, 43-48. 
Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness: On depression, development, and death. San 
Francisco: Freeman. 
Shapiro, D. H., & Shapiro, J. (1983). Self-control concerns for men and women: 
Refinement and extension of a construct. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 39, 
878-892. 
Shaw, R. J. (1989). The role of control in the selection and effectiveness of coping 
strategies used by nursing home residents. (Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Texas at Austin, 1989). Dissertation Abstracts International, 50, 2849. 
Shweder, R., & Bourne, E. J. (1982). Does the concept of the person vary cross-
culturally? In A. J. Marsella & G. M. White (Eds.), Cultural conceptions of 
mental health and therapy (pp. 97-137). London: Reidel. 
Siegel, B. S. (1986). Love, Medicine and Miracles. NY: Harper & Row. 
Siegel, B. S. (1989). Peace, Love and Healing. NY: Harper & Row. 
87 
Silver, R. L., Boon, C., & Stones, M. H. (1983). Searching for meaning in misfortune: 
Making sense of incest. Journal of Social Issues, 39, (2), 81-102. 
Simonton, 0. C., Mathews-Simonton, S., & Creighton, J. L. (1978). Getting Well 
Again. Los Angeles: J.P. Tarcher. 
Sinha, Y., Jain, U. C., & Pandey, J. (1980). Attributions of causality of poverty. 
Journal of Social and Economic Studies, 3, 349-359. 
Spiegel, D., Bloom, J. R., Kraemer, H. C., et al. (1989). Effect of psychosocial 
treatment on survival of patients with metastatic breast cancer. Lancet, 888-890. 
Spilka, B., & Bridges, R. A. (1989). Theology and psychological theory: 
Psychological implications of some modem theologies. Journal of Psychology 
and Theology. 17, (4), 343-351. 
Sternberg, R. J. (1990). Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Stipek, D. J., Tannatt, L., & Sanborn, M. (1981, April). Children's perceptions of 
competence in school. Paper presented at the meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association, Boston, MA. 
Stipek, D., & Weisz, J. R. (1981). Children's perceptions of personal control and 
academic achievement. Review of Educational Research, 51, 101-137. 
Strickland, B. R. (1978). Internal-external expectancies and health-related behaviors. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 1192-1211. 
Strickland, B. R., & Shaffer, S. (1971). 1-E, 1-E, and F. Journal for the Scientific Study 
88 
of Religion, 10, 366-369. 
Suomi, S. J. (1981). The perception of contingency and social development. In M. E. 
Lamb & L. R. Sherrod (Eds.), Infant social cognition: Empirical and theoretical 
considerations. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Syme, S. L. (1990). Control and health: An epidemiological perspective. In J. Rodin, 
C. Schooler & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Self-directedness: Cause and effects 
throughout the life course (pp. 213-229). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Taylor, S. E. (1983). Adjustment to threatening events: A theory of cognitive 
adaptation. American Psychologist, 38, 1161-1173. 
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological 
perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103 (2), 193-210. 
Taylor, S. E., Collins, R. L., Skokan, L. A., & Aspinwall, L. G. (1989). Maintaining 
positive illusions in the face of negative information: Getting the facts without 
letting them get to you. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 8, 114-129. 
Taylor, S.E., Helgeson, V. S., Reed, G. M., & Skokan, L.A. (1991). Self-generated 
feelings of control and adjustment to physical illness. Journal of Social issues, 
47 (4), 91-109. 
Taylor, S. E., Kemeny, M. E., Reed, G. M., & Aspinwall, L. G. (1991). Assault on the 
self: Positive illusions and adjustment to threatening events. In G. A. Goethals & 
J. A. Strauss (eds.), The self: An interdisciplinary perspective (pp. 239-254). 
New York: Springer. 
Taylor, S. E., Lichtman, R.R., & Wood, J. V. (1984). Attributions, beliefs about 
control, and adjustment to breast cancer. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 46, 489-502. 
Tebbi, C. K., Mallon, J.C., Richards, M. E., & Bigler, L. R. (1987). Religiosity and 
locus of control of adolescent cancer patients. Psychological Reports, 61, 683-
696. 
Tennan, H., Affleck, G., Allen, D. A., McGrade, B. J., & Ratzan, S. (1984). Causal 
attributions and coping with insulin-dependent diabetes. Basic and Applied 
Social Psychology, 5 (2), 131-142. 
89 
Tennen, H., Affleck, G., & Gershman, K. (1986). Self-blame among parents of infants 
with perinatal complications: The role of self-protective motives. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 50, (4), 690-696. 
Tennen, H., Affleck, G., & Mendola, R. (1991). Causal explanations for infertility: 
Their relation to control appraisals and psychological adjustment. In A. Stanton 
& C. Dunkel-Schetter (Eds.), Infertility: Perspectives from stress and coping 
research (pp. 109-132). New York: Plenum. 
Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York: 
Wiley. 
Thompson, S. C. (1981). Will it hurt less if I can control it? A complex answer to a 
simple question. Psychological Bulletin, 90, (1), 89-101. 
Thompson, S C. (1985). Finding positive meaning in a stressful event and coping. 
Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 6 (4), 279-295. 
Thompson, S. C., & Spacapan, S. (1991). Perceptions of control in vulnerable 
populations. Journal of Social Issues, 47 (4), 1-21. 
Trillin, A. S. (1981). Of dragons and garden peas: A cancer patient talks to doctors. 
New England Journal of Medicine, 304 (12), 699-701. 
Trommsdorff, G. (1991). Child-rearing and children's empathy. Perceptual and Motor 
Skills, 72, 387-390. 
Viscott, D. (1976). The language of feelings. New York: Pocket Books. 
Walker, C. J., & Blaine, B. (1991). The virulence of dread rumors: A field 
experiment. Language & Communication, 11 (4) 291-297. 
Wallston, K., Wallston, B. S., Smith, S., & Dobbins, C. J. (1987). Perceived control 
and health. Current Psychological Research & Reviews, 6 (1), 5-25. 
Walster, E. (1966). Assignment of responsibility for an accident. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 73-79. 
Watson, J. S. (1971). Cognitive perceptual development in infancy: Setting for the 
seventies. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 139-152. 
Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
90 
Weisz, J. R. (1977). A follow-up developmental study of hypothesis behavior among 
retarded and nonretarded children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
24, 108-122. 
Weisz, J. R. (1980). Developmental change in perceived control: Recognizing 
noncontingency in the laboratory and perceiving it in the world. Developmental 
Psychology, 16 (5), 385-390. 
Weisz, J. R. (1981). Illusory contingency in children at the state fair. Developmental 
Psychology, 17 (4), 481-489. 
Weisz, J. R. (1983). Can I control it? The pursuit of veridical answers across the life 
span. Life-Span Development, 5, 233-300. 
Weisz, J. R. ( 1986a). Contingency and control beliefs as predictors of psychotherapy 
outcomes among children and adolescents. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 54 (6), 789-795. 
Weisz, J. R. (1986b). Understanding the developing understanding of control. In M. 
Perlmutter (Ed.), Cognitive perspectives on children's social and behavioral 
91 
development: The Minnesota symposia on child psychology (Vol. 18, pp. 219-
275). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Weisz, J. R. (1990). Development of control-related beliefs, goals, and styles in 
childhood and adolescence: A clinical perspective. In J. Rodin, C. Schooler, & 
K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Self-directedness: Cause and effects throughout the life 
course (pp. 103-145). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Weisz, J. R., & Achenbach, T. M. (1975). The effects of IQ and MA on hypothesis 
behavior in normal and retarded children. Developmental Psychology, 11, 304-
310. 
Weisz, J. R., Rothbaum, F. M., & Blackbum, T. F. (1984). Standing out and standing 
in: The psychology of control in America and Japan. American Psychologist, 
39, 955-969. 
Weisz, J. R., Rothbaum, F. M., & Blackbum, T. F. (1984). Swapping recipes for 
control. American Psychologist, 39, 974-975. 
Weisz, J. R., Weiss, B., Wasserman, A. A., & Rintoul, B. (1987). Control-related 
beliefs and depression among clinic-referred children and adolescents. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 96 (1), 58-63. 
Weisz, J. R., Yeates, K. 0., Robertson, D., & Beckham, J.C. (1982). Perceived 
contingency of skill and chance events: A developmental analysis. 
Developmental Psychology, 18 (6), 898-905. 
White, C. B., & Janson, P. (1986). Helplessness in institutional settings: Adaptation or 
iatrogenic disease? In M. M. Baltes & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), The Psychology of 
Control and Aging (pp. 297-313). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Williams, R. B., Jr., & Barefoot, J.C. (1988). Coronary-prone behavior: The 
emerging role of the hostility complex. In B. K. Houston & C. R. Snyder (Eds.), 
92 
Type A behavior pattern: Research, theory, and intervention. New York: Wiley. 
Witenberg, S., Blanchard, E., Suls, J., Tennen, H., McCoy, G., & McGoldrick, M. 
(1983). Perceptions of control and causality as predictors of compliance and 
coping in hemodialysis. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 4, 319-336. 
Wolfenstein, M. (1957). Disaster: A psychological essay. Glencoe, IL: The Free 
Press. 
Wong, P. T. P. (1992). Control is a double-edged sword. Canadian Journal of 
Behavioural Science, 24 (2), 143-146. 
Wong, P. T. P., & Sproule, C. F. (1983). An attributional analysis of the locus of 
control construct and the Trent Attribution Profile (TAP). In H. M. Lefcourt 
(Ed.), Research with the locus of control construct: Vol. 2. Methods and 
application (pp. 309-360). New York: Academic Press. 
Wortman, C. B., & Silver, R. C. (1989). The myths of coping with loss. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 57, 349-357. 
Yankelovich, D. (1982). Reagan and the national psyche. Psychology Today, 16 (1), 
5-8. 
Yates, J. W., Chalmer, B. J., St. James, P., Follansbee, M., & McKegney, F. P. (1981). 
Religion in patients with advanced cancer. Medical & Pediatric Oncology, 9, 
121-128. 
Yetman, N. R. (1970). Voices from slavery. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. 
Ziegler, M., & Reid, D. W. (1983). Correlates of changes in desired control scores and 
in life satisfaction scores among elderly persons. International Journal of Aging 
and Human Development, 16, 135-146. 
VITA 
The author, Beverly Edmonds, daughter of the late John Calvin and Marceline 
Dixon, was born September 20, 1948, in Alvin, Texas. She received her B.A. at Trinity 
University in San Antonio, Texas in 1978,where she was elected a member of Phi Beta 
Kappa and Alpha Chi. 
In 1977, she founded CONT ACT of San Antonio, a 24-hour crisis intervention 
hotline. She served as its Executive Director for over three years. In 1981, she 
established Beverly Myers and Associates, a training and consulting firm. After moving 
to the Chicago area, Mrs. Edmonds became the Executive Director of the National 
Runaway Switchboard and Adolescent Suicide Hotline. She entered the masters 
program in community counseling at Loyola University full-time the following year. 
While working on her masters, Mrs. Edmonds served as Acting Director of the Center 
for Human Services Management of George Williams College, and as a substance abuse 
therapist and Coordinator of the Community Prevention Program for Family Service 
and Mental Health Center of Oak Park and River Forest. 
Mrs. Edmonds resides in Wildwood, Illinois, with her husband and two 
daughters. She completed her Master of Arts degree in 1993. 
THESIS APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis Primary and Secondary Control: A Study of the Two Process Theory, Its 
Context and Applications had been read and approved by the following 
committee: 
Dr. Marilyn Susman, Director 
Assistant Professor, Counseling and Educational Psychology 
Loyola University of Chicago 
Dr. Carol G. Harding 
Professor, Counseling and Educational Psychology 
Loyola University of Chicago 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the 
signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes 
have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval by the 
Committee with reference to content and form. 
The thesis is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Arts. 
April 16, 1993 
